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ABSTRACT 
US national security strategy calls for the use of military force to shape cultures 
beyond US borders.  However, the relationship between the use of force and changes in 
cultural processes is poorly understood.  Operationalizing culture as socially transmitted 
behavior, and treating culture systematically using open systems theory, best allows us to 
understand the perils and prospects of acting upon culture with force.  In particular, this 
thesis explores the narrative and storytelling dimensions of culture, offering a theory of 
story that can be used to drive innovative counter-terrorism strategies and structure 
general principles for prevailing in the “story war.”  Using case studies from the British 
Iraqi Mandate on the failure to treat culture systemically, and from Hizballah on the 
generation of surrogate consciousness and alternate identity, the analysis derives general 
guidance for strategists and policymakers concerned about the force and culture equation.  
It can be used to drive new research programs in counter-terrorism (such as exploring the 
neural mechanisms undergirding radicalization), fill in gaps in intelligence collection and 
analysis, and pave the way for modeling and simulation of the force/culture interaction 
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I. FORCE, CULTURE CHANGE, AND STORIES:  
AN OVERVIEW 
A. THE PROBLEM OF FORCE AND CULTURE 
According to Carl von Clausewitz, war—the use of force so as to impose your 
will on an adversary—is an extension of politics.  When non-coercive methods fail to 
allow potential adversaries to reach political accommodation, and where the stakes are 
high enough such that at least one party to the dispute is willing to use force so as to 
authoritatively allocate value, then the application of violence to resolve the conflict will 
be inevitable.  The professional soldier, airman or sailor will be especially skilled at 
applying violence systematically so as to achieve the desired coercive effect; this 
constitutes the warrior profession’s raison d’etre.  Deterrence, dissuasion, and the other 
various terms of art wielded by these professionals to characterize the proximate effect of 
using (or possessing the capacity to use) force are all subordinate to this ultimate coercive 
purpose. 
This is a persuasive story regarding what end military force can and does serve; 
however, in a complex and multi-faceted security environment, it is far from being the 
entire story regarding those ends.  In a world presently dominated by a sole superpower 
(the United States), the goals served by the application of force are yet more subtle.  
Unfortunately, the theoretical apparatus required to allow us to be able to make sense of 
just how the use of force achieves results in these other realms has not kept pace with the 
desire of both state and non-state actors to use violence to achieve these extended and 
more complex objectives. 
In the case of the United States, many aspects of our current national security 
strategy—especially in the counter-terrorism domain—are essentially clarion calls for the 
use of military force to change, influence and shape culture.  For example, the Greater 
Middle East Initiative announced by President George W. Bush in 2002 calls for U.S. 
support (direct and indirect) for democratization in Southwest Asia.  Given that the 
process of democratization consists in large part of changing how political society 
functions in a given sovereign area, it is not a stretch to argue that this initiative, and  
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aspects of it which have made their way into both the U.S. National Security Strategy and 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, are at their core calls for the use of force to change the 
nature of cultures elsewhere. 
The problem, however, is that we have not sufficiently articulated a workable 
theory of culture, one that describes both what a culture is—its objects and processes, its 
“moving parts”—and how military force could interact with it to produce some desired 
outcome.  The essential problematic for this thesis is to make headway in this space: offer 
a strategically useful theory of culture, focus on a particularly important piece of it 
(narrative and storytelling), and limn the prospects for using military force to shape that 
piece. 
This charter is, of course, far too broad to constitute a thesis-length research 
question; exploring these problems in depth is a project for several books, not just a few 
pages.  The next few sections delimit the problem further and offer a preview of what 
will be discussed in the remaining chapters. 
 
B. DELIMITING THE PROBLEM 
For the purposes of understanding the relationship between the application of 
military force and the shifting of a culture, “culture” itself is best operationalized as 
socially transmitted behaviors and the processes which reproduce them.  This allows us 
to distinguish between those aspects of human behavior which are driven by brute 
biological causes (the fact that human beings mostly breathe air is not a cultural 
phenomenon) and those determined by the social environment (the fact that members of 
the military salute each other when outdoors is a fact about military culture). 
Even so, the range of human behaviors encompassed in this problem set is 
tremendous; everything ranging from where and what we eat to whom we respect to how 
we react to violence is at least partially a result of the influence of culture upon behavior.  
By necessity, this thesis will focus on those aspects of culture which are (1) most salient 
to national security issues, (2) have been relatively neglected in the security literature, 
and (3) are especially innovative or exciting.  While I will discuss several aspects of 
culture, the thesis will dwell mostly upon the narrative and story-telling dimensions of 
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national security and culture, for reasons that will become obvious over the course of the 
discussion.  Moreover, by dint of the author’s background in terrorism and political 
violence, most of this thesis will focus on cultural issues most salient to formulating 
effective counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and management of violent social 
movement strategy.  It would be a quixotic quest indeed to catalog the full array of 
possible interactions between the instruments of state power and human socially 
transmitted behaviors.  Instead, the patient reader will have to settle for my admittedly 
eclectic selection of issues. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is driven by a combination of deductive and inductive methods.  On 
the one hand, when there is independent reason to believe that a well-accepted theory has 
explanatory power for a particular phenomenon, providing inductive justification for the 
theory is otiose.  It would be more useful instead to just apply the machinery of the theory 
to the domain in question to see if interesting results can be generated.  On the other 
hand, these interesting results bear out first-pass empirical examination.  Selected case 
studies, and references to longitudinal studies from other researchers which provide 
support for the derivation of the counter-intuitive result, will accomplish this goal.  Since 
the causes of human behavior are myriad, so too will the disciplines which we bring to 
bear to understand those causes be.  While this thesis is an exercise in political science, 
results from the contemporary cognitive sciences, neuroscience, social psychology, 
economics, political psychology, sociology and biology will be used often.  Since the 
proximate cause of all non-reflex human behavior is the brain, the extant sciences of the 
mind will be especially important. 
 
D. PREVIEW 
Chapter II of this thesis offers a theoretical backdrop for thinking of culture 
systematically.  Culture ought to be treated as socially transmitted behavior.  The 
mechanisms responsible for this transmission, and the behaviors which result, should be 
treated as an open system a la Ludwig von Bertalanffy: as consisting of parts which 
interact to realize certain functions, all the while exchanging matter and energy with their 
4 
surrounding environment.  Treating culture systematically, in this technical sense of the 
term, will enable planners and strategists to ensure they neither ignore a critical part of 
the system of culture nor reify other less-well developed approaches to culture present in 
the literature.  After setting up this theoretical scaffolding, chapter two uses a case study 
from 1920’s Iraq both as proof of concept and to demonstrate empirically what can 
happen when military strategists fail to treat culture as a system, and hence fail to take it 
seriously. 
Chapter III delves into much more detail about a particular aspect of the system of 
culture: those processes responsible for the formulation and promulgation of stories and 
narratives.  Consideration of the narrative aspects of culture can shed light on multiple 
problem areas in contemporary security policy.  The first half of the chapter offers a 
nascent theory of story: using Gustav Freytag’s concept of the Freytag triangle, which 
leads to an exploration of how stories can influence such politically important concepts as 
identity, and how they can especially be used by terrorist organizations and groups for 
purposes ranging from recruitment of new members to the shoring up of stakeholder 
support.  Using previous work accomplished by colleagues, the chapter briefly applies 
systems theory to terrorist organizational life-cycles.  In addition, it offers a framework 
for thinking about the efficacy of stories: the neo-Aristotelian notion of ethos, logos and 
pathos.  Finally, it discusses how these theoretic considerations could usefully lead to 
what James Russell and Troy Thomas have called “counter-narrative strategies,” which 
are briefly outlined. 
Chapter IV adds more cultural meat to the storytelling skeleton.  It examines the 
evolution and development of Lebanon’s Hizballah from the perspective of narrative 
theory, arguing that Hizballah has been hard at work developing surrogate consciousness 
on behalf of the Palestinian plight among Hizballah’s core shia faithful, and that the 
process of storytelling has been critical in achieving this objective.  This chapter briefly 
discusses what implications these developments might have for the future of Hizballah 
and the region. 
Chapter V combines these tools into a new index which strategists interested in 
political violence can use to forecast and possibly even predict the emergence of violent 
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non-state actors and organizations.  The At-Risk Group Identity Index (ARGI Index) also 
usefully highlights the nature of the risk which decision-makers face when confronting a 
violent social movement: they can be “fast burning” or “slow burning” depending upon 
where they fall in the two dimensional ARGI space.  This has entailments for how their 
emergence can be prevented, and what can be done to control their ontogeny if they do 
arise nonetheless. 
Finally, Chapter VI offers some final thoughts on what strategists can learn from 
taking the force and culture equation seriously.  These include importing ecological 
thinking into counter-terrorism strategy, and otherwise being humble in some respects 
with regards to what can be accomplished, but quite hopeful in others.  In addition to 
overarching principles for winning a culture change struggle, it discusses in some detail 
how the neurosciences might prove especially useful for helping us understand culturally 
important psychological phenomena in strategically important detail.  The conclusion is 
cautiously hopeful: while we can’t expect military force to be useful in many culture-
change related circumstances, we can also see how force can usefully shape the 
environment so as to make some types of socially transmitted behavior more likely than 
others.  Hopeful humility should frame our approach to the use of military force to shift 
culture.  Understanding when the shift is possible and when it can only be influenced, and 
at least in the case of stories how culture and force interact to produce some changes 
rather than others, is critically important if we are to retain the moral high-ground when it 










































II. TREATING CULTURE AS A SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE 
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE IRAQ MANDATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and its coalition partners have been militarily involved in Iraq 
since March 19, 2003, when Operation Iraqi Freedom I began.  Three years later, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom I has ended, “major combat operations” have ceased, and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom II is now in full swing, with coalition forces attempting to 
stabilize the country until full sovereignty for Iraq becomes a practical reality.  Aside 
from traditional generic concerns about nation-building, one could be forgiven for 
thinking that there would be relatively little that region-specific recent history might have 
to offer coalition forces as they confront a nascent Iraqi insurgency; but less than 80 years 
ago, America’s closest coalition partner—Great Britain—had similar experiences in the 
same country during their governance of it as a mandate.  British lessons from the 
1920s—when Iraq was first founded—are more pertinent for us than ever.  This chapter 
argues that British “lessons learned” can be summarized in one sentence: during 
occupation and reconstruction, imperial powers must be sensitive to the fact that culture 
is a system.  If political realities are to shift and nations are to be built, or at least 
reconfigured, then we must take into account political and social mechanisms operative 
on the ground in the region we wish to influence. 
To make this case, the chapter serves three purposes.  First, it will briefly 
establish a theoretical framework for thinking about “culture as a system,” moving 
beyond Talcott Parson’s mid-twentieth century model to a more subtle biological cum 
psychological conception of cultural processes.  Second, it will discuss two major 
accounts of British experiences with the Iraqi mandate—that of Toby Dodge in his 2003 
opus Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Columbia University Press), and that of Charles Tripp in his recently revised 2000 book 
A History of Iraq (New York: Cambridge University Press).  It will focus in particular on 
Dodge’s account of five factors the British failed to take into account, arguing that 
Dodge’s concluding chapter does not do full justice to the lessons that actually follow 
from taking his theses seriously.  This sets the stage for an examination of one critical 
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portion of culture—the narrative and storytelling aspects—in the next chapter, and also 
foreshadows some of the lessons learned from taking culture seriously discussed briefly 
in the concluding chapter. 
 
B. CULTURES AND SYSTEMS 
What would it mean to treat culture as a system?  To answer this question, we 
must have some idea of what ‘culture’ is and what ‘systems’ are.  This is not merely a 
semantic matter, as both these terms are theory-laden to the hilt.  Culture is often thought 
to refer to social practices that are peculiar to a region or people; for instance, it’s part of 
American culture that we place our index finger against our thumb while saying “A-OK” 
in order to let someone know we approve of their actions, while in some parts of 
Southwest Asia the equivalent gesture is offensive as it is seen as an attempt to curse the 
recipient.  On this (shallow) view, to understand another culture means things like “don’t 
eat with your left hand” or “don’t show the sole of your foot” when traveling in Iraq.  
However, culture consists of far more than customs and courtesies.1  In this respect, the 
best working definition of culture uses Franz Boas as a starting point (Boas was an early 
twentieth century German cultural anthropologist)—“The system of shared beliefs, 
values, customs, behaviours, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with 
their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation 
through learning.”2 
This working definition highlights several important things about “culture.”  First, 
culture is something that is shared between people; second, culture is primarily 
psychological, or the material manifestation (such as produced artifacts) of psychological 
processes3; third, culture is essentially adaptive (it will almost always be useful to ask 
                                                 
1 I am not saying we should ignore these components of culture.  On the contrary, they can in some 
contexts be critically important.  As William Graham Sumner notes in Folkways and Mores (New York: 
Schocken, 1906), 3, culture results from “…the frequent repetition of petty acts.” 
2 Daniel G. Bates and Fred Plog, Cultural Anthropology, 2nd Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1980), 7. 
3 I realize this goes against the grain of contemporary sociological thinking.  So be it.  An elaborate 
defense of the reducibility of sociological facts to facts about group and individual psychology is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  An intuition that there is no such thing as “social aether” is all that is needed at this 
point.  In many respects, my approach is like that of Durkheim’s, but I explicitly reject any unjustified 
dualisms, preferring a token reduction of the sociological to the psychological. 
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“What is this for?” or “Why do they do this?”); and finally, culture is learned and 
transmitted through some process.  These distinctions are important, especially for 
military planners. 
The intensely social nature of culture will mean that one way to shift cultures is to 
enter into the social arena, and this will often require more people than would otherwise 
be the case (you can change the nature of a social entity by changing the amount of 
endogenously-inserted social creatures within it).  The primacy of the psychological 
means that culture change will primarily (though not only, as we will discuss later) be a 
psychological operation.  The adaptive nature of culture means that in the long run even 
if you are not able to change a culture internally, you may be able to get it to change by 
shifting the environment in which it evolves.  Finally, since culture is learned (and not 
innate or genetically specified), that means it is part of an open system: with appropriate 
instruments, we can change the inputs and processes so that a different set of cultural 
norms, values and beliefs are output.  Ex hypothesi, this is a good thing, as arguably 
Operation Iraqi Freedom is all about shifting a culture so that it embraces democracy and 
shuns extremist militancy (even if it is not a good thing, this framework is useful because 
it helps us understand why that would be the case). 
The tools we can use to shift culture are myriad, although it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to examine them in any detail.  Still, how cultures evolve in generica is 
useful to think about.  Richerson and Boyd4 discuss several mechanisms.  Random forces 
include things like cultural mutation (e.g., someone misremembers an item of culture), 
cultural drift (effects caused by statistical anomalies in small populations; for example, if 
someone specializes in boat-building and that person dies owing to a chance event then 
the culture of boat building will disappear from that society).  Decision-driven forces 
include guided variation (nonrandom changes driven by transformations in social 
learning), and biased transmission (such as direct bias, where individuals are more likely 
to remember or perform culture based on content; frequency-based bias, where 
                                                 
4 Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human 
Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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commonness or rarity of a cultural variant influences choice; and model-based bias, 
where cultural traits are chosen based on who is exhibiting the trait).5 
Now that we have some idea of what culture is and how it changes over time, we 
can discuss what it would mean to treat culture as an open system.6   
Systems theory serves as the diagnostic model for culture.  This approach, derived 
from the general systems theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, conceptualizes a system as 
an organized cohesive complex of elements standing in interaction.  Interaction refers to 
two generalized patterns of behavior: 1) the relationships among the “complex elements,” 
or subsystems of culture; and 2) the relationship between the complex whole of culture 
and its environment (the super-system). The former constitute the transformational 
processes of culture, telling us how culture is produced and changes, while the latter 
draws attention to the reality that cultures are open systems, continually exchanging 
information and energy with their surrounding environment. 
As Thomas notes, “[a]s systems theory has matured, its benefits have been 
clarified.  Thomas G. Cummings summarizes the positive “fallout” from systems 
thinking in his foundational book, Systems Theory for Organizational Development.”7  
While Cummings is talking about how systems thinking has improved our ability to 
design and influence organizations, his thoughts apply equally well to cultures.  Systems 
thinking 1) enables thinking about cultures at a higher level of abstraction; it requires 
thinking in terms of general characteristics rather than thinking about a particular 
organization or similarities between particular organizations; 2) transcends the branches 
of science; 3) provides a common language for understanding organizational phenomena; 
4) enables thinking in relational terms rather than things, leading to a process oriented 
and contextual views of cultures; 5) stimulates holistic appreciation of whole properties 
of cultures; 6) leads to an appreciation for two kinds of meaning explanation, the first 
                                                 
5 There is so much of importance I’m omitting from this paragraph, including the symbolic nature of 
culture and its relationship to individual meaning.  These are topics for future papers. 
6 The discussion in the next two paragraphs owes much to Troy Thomas’s research for the Thomas 
and Casebeer Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper Violent Systems (Colorado Springs: 
Institute for National Security Studies, 2003).  See it (available online at 
http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/occasion.cfm) for references and citations. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
7 Thomas et al, 7. 
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being traditional deductive analysis derived for logic and the second being pattern 
analysis from the “gestalt processes of the human mind;” 7) and gives the potential for 
world defining by the culture itself (a critical part of meaning creation).8  In 
organizational theory, the term diagnosis means to employ systems thinking to assess a 
target organization’s condition so as to improve it; for our working theory of culture 
change, diagnosis will mean understanding cultures from that perspective for the purpose 
of influencing their development or changing them. 
Talcott Parsons is perhaps the best-known proponent of the idea that we should 
treat culture (indeed, all of sociology) as a system, and his work has usefully informed 
this paper.  Parson’s work is of uncertain status today; the functionalism that informs it is 
out of favor in many circles.9  Still, his work is important, and my intuition is that nascent 
fields such as evolutionary psychology and cognitive neurobiology will put the teleology 
back into thinking, and that there will be a neo-Parsonian renaissance as a result.  Even 
so, systems thinking has advanced since Parson’s time; it is now biological more than 
mechanical, with fewer deterministic assumptions and more respect for developmental 
issues and holistic concerns.  To summarize: treating culture as a system involves 
identifying culture’s relationships to the environment, discussing the inputs, 
transformative processes and outputs that result in shared beliefs and values in a society; 
culture is thus both a process and a product, a verb and a noun.  The next portion of this 
chapter summarizes the results of Dodge’s research into the British Iraqi Mandate using 
this terminology, beginning with an overview of the historical backdrop. 
 
C. BACKDROP: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE COLLAPSES & BRITISH 
IMPERIAL POWER WANES 
The League of Nations awarded Iraq to Britain as a mandate in 1920.  To 
understand why this happened, we need to grasp the large-scale historical forces at work 
at the time.  First, the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, and the power vacuum produced 
by this collapse was being filled by imperial and colonial powers such as England and 
                                                 
8 Thomas et al, 6–8. 
9 For an introduction, see chapter 5 of Malcom Waters, Modern Sociological Theory (London: Sage 
Publications, 1994).  For pointed criticisms, see 176–187 of Trevor Noble, Social Theory and Social 
Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 
12 
France.  Great Britain was busy occupying former Ottoman territory in Mesopotamia, 
such as Basra (taken in November, 1914), Baghdad (captured in March, 1917), and 
Mosul (occupied in November, 1918); given its strategic importance as a land bridge 
between the Mediterranean and India, British interest in the region was understandable.  
While this may give the impression that European imperialism was waxing rather than 
waning, that is not the case.  Second, European hegemony, under-girded by notions of 
cultural superiority, was in the decline.  Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations was busy 
planning how to ensure stability in a world where imperial interests had otherwise 
provided form and structure to the international environment.  The Mandate system was 
an expression of the waning power of Britain and France rather than a vindication of it.10 
These two facts more than anything else shaped the early history of Iraq.  No 
longer an Ottoman protectorate, nor a straight-forward British Imperial possession, the 
new Mandate of Iraq had to be shaped into a nation-state capable of independence from 
its nominal protector Great Britain, replete with all the capacities required for self-rule 
and sovereignty.  The League charged Britain with the responsibility of ensuring this 
transition took place with a minimum of fuss.  But owing to British failure to treat culture 
as a system, the transition was to be anything but smooth. 
 
D. DODGE ON BRITISH MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
Dodge contends that five factors contributed to the British failure to successfully 
manage Iraq’s transition to sovereignty.  First, British administrators wore “conceptual 
blinders” regarding the nature of the Ottoman legacy in Mesopotamia; they romanticized 
‘untainted’ and ‘incorruptible’ rural tribal leaders and vilified the ‘sleazy’ effendi and 
city-dwelling remnants of the Ottoman Empire.  Second, and for related reasons, the 
British thought of Iraqi society as being deeply split between urban and rural populations, 
with the urban population unfairly stifling the agency of those living in the desert and 
countryside.  Third, Britain misunderstood the role of the Shaikh in the region’s culture, 
using this pre-modern figure as a channel for Herbert Simon-style bureaucratic cum 
rational administrative methods when they should have chosen other actors.  Fourth, the 
British misunderstood the “social meaning of land” by implementing European-style land                                                  
10 Summary ideas taken primarily from Dodge’s opening chapter. 
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tenure, elevating the Shaikh/Tribe over the Mallak/Sarkal, which backfired given the 
shaikh’s tenuous political authority.  Finally, British use of airpower reinforced Iraqi 
perceptions that the British were despots, undermining their ability to influence the 
culture.11  I’ll discuss each of these in turn in more detail, contrasting Tripp’s take on 
events when it differs from Dodge’s interpretation. 
Dodge’s first point boils down to the familiar objection that the British were in the 
grip of Orientalist delusions about the nature of Ottoman rule.  Stereotypes were 
reinforced by the lack of empirically grounded knowledge about Ottoman governing 
structures.  Two central stereotypes were: first, that the Ottoman Empire was 
superstitious, violent and corrupt; and second, that Iraq was fundamentally divided 
between tainted urbanites and Ottoman administrators and pure uncorrupted country-folk 
(the second is discussed more in the next section).  As a result, the British thought of 
themselves as clearing away a “bad” Ottoman administrative apparatus so that a “good” 
British one could be put in place. 
The literature of the time from those involved in British administration reinforced 
this impression.  Consider British administrator–scholar Stephen Longrigg’s statements 
in his book, written while serving in the British Expeditionary Force in the country: over 
400 years of stagnant Ottoman rule, Iraq had changed little; the Ottomans had let the Iraqi 
people down in every respect, forsaking their “essential duties,” failing to secure liberty 
and rights for the “…governed (however backward)”.12  This misimpression did great 
harm to Britain’s ability to staff the revamped nascent Iraqi administration, as most of 
those who were educated enough to run the institutions had in fact been trained by the 
Ottomans, and it also reinforced the other factors Dodge discusses as complicating 
Britain’s situation.13 
                                                 
11 This final point could be the basis for an entire book, supremely relevant to contemporary Air Force 
planners in Iraq. 
12 Paraphrased from Dodge, 47. 
13 Tripp’s discussion of the British Mandate in chapter two of his book is curiously devoid of any 
references to Orientalism or British attitudes (the word “orientalism” does not even appear in the index).  
There are a few passing references to British condescension towards Iraqi ability to self-govern, but aside 
from this there’s no substance along which to compare Tripp and Dodge on this axis.  Of course, this is in 
itself telling. 
14 
The second factor influencing Britain’s ability to manage Iraq is closely related to 
the first.  The British tended to treat Iraqi citizens as immature children (indeed, Gertrude 
Bell wrote in 1907 that “The Oriental is like a very old child…”)14.  Those who were 
capable of self-rule were, unfortunately, already corrupted by the Ottoman influence.  
This made it easy for Great Britain to marginalize the opinions of the Iraqi public and to 
paint native administrators as being licentious overly sensual creatures.  The 
demonization of rural centers and the elevation of rural leaders oversimplified the 
political culture of Iraq, making tribes the monolithic and dominant entity when in fact 
they were not. 
This led to the third factor contributing to British difficulties: their choice of the 
“strategic Shaikh” (original thesis verbiage) as the critical lever of political power.  The 
British misconstrued the role that tribal shaikh’s played in Iraqi life.  A shaikh’s 
community was fuzzy and oft-times ill defined, and the “shallow foundations” of a 
shaikh’s power sometimes became all too visible when the British attempted to overlay a 
rational-bureaucratic form of social organization onto this organic community.15 
Tripp’s take on Britain’s use of tribal shaikhs is not as explicitly critical.  He 
implies only indirectly that the British attempt to use shaikhs as power-laden 
intermediaries changed the shaikhs motivations.16  Tripp argues that the spread of the 
1920 revolt against the British was fueled in part by how local leaders though British 
policies were influencing their power (as would be expected, tribal sheikhs in places like 
Kut and ‘Amara did not join the revolt, while the marginalized urban Sunni notables 
actively encouraged it), which is indirect evidence for some of Dodge’s points.17 
Directly related to Britain’s “bureaucratization” of shaikh power was their 
misunderstanding of the social meaning of land (Dodge’s fourth factor).  Managing land 
ownership and taxation is a critical part of nation-building, so it’s no wonder that a 
British misapprehension here would have problematic consequences.  In order to make 
taxation rational, all land parcels had to be divided up and assigned to individuals or 
                                                 
14 Dodge, 64. 
15 Ibid., 87. 
16 See the discussion on p. 42 of Tripp. 
17 Tripp, 44. 
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institutions (this was how it became possible to know from whom to collect revenue).  In 
the pre-colonial world, communal ownership, or flexible seasonal occupation, were 
usually the norm; “…individual ownership was often an alien concept.”18  In order to 
correct this shortcoming in efficiency to ensure that land was both owned by someone 
and farmed efficiently by them, the British Mandate staff had to choose between two 
approaches: focusing on the role of the shaikh or focusing on the role of the sarkal.  The 
former was seen as reinforcing communal bonds, whereas leveraging the sarkal (the 
sarkal was the tenant or foreman in charge of organizing farming operations; he worked 
for the mallak, or landlord, who had the right to demand mallakiyah, or rent)19.  Since the 
British had already thrown their governance lot in with the sheikhs, it was only logical 
they would do so again when it came time for land reform.  This was, ultimately, a 
political call on the part of the British—it would have been more efficient to collect taxes 
from the mallaks and sarkals than from other intermediaries. 
Some British figures pointed out that it was an error to assume so much power 
and responsibility devolved to the shaikh or tribal figurehead (see, e.g., Major S. E. 
Hedgcock’s concerns, discussed on p. 115 of Dodge).  But this did not stop the overall 
thrust of British policy from remaining shaikh-centered; for this reason (as Dodge 
elaborates during his discussion of the unrest in Muntafiq), the British did “ontological 
violence to Iraqi society.”20  What’s worse, tax collection policy was rendered inefficient, 
which hindered the establishment of a capable Iraqi state.  As a result, British imperial 
power manifested itself most starkly in the form of airpower. 
This is the fifth major factor Dodge considers: the use of British airpower to 
impose order and enforce the collection of land taxes led to the perception of British 
Mandate officials as being despotic in their use of force.  Rather than being seen as 
paternalistic, British instruments of state power were perceived as being despotic and 
indiscriminant.  The “cost free” nature of bombing, surveillance from the air, and air 
“triumphalism” (all of which led to the RAF taking responsibility for order in all of Iraq 
in October 1922) contributed to Iraqi perceptions of the British as being the new 
                                                 
18 Dodge, 105. 
19 Ibid., 109. 
20 Ibid., 129. 
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imperialists rather than old friends.21   Interestingly, when Tripp discusses airpower he 
does so not in the context of despotism, but rather by noting that ex-Ottoman officials 
viewed airpower as being of little use without “boots on the ground”; this informed 
debates about the necessity of conscription in the new Iraqi state.22 
Ultimately, airpower, while authoritative, was despotic; it needed a political 
intermediary on the ground in order to be effective, and Britain’s chosen intermediary of 
the shaikh was not up to the task for the reasons already discussed. 
The British shortcomings Dodge discusses directly contributed to the multiple 
revolts and insurgencies faced by Great Britain during the mandate period (see pp. 31 – 
37 in Tripp for an effective summary; as we are pressed for space, this chapter will not 
discuss in detail the chronology of revolts and insurgencies), reaching its peak in 1920, 
and spending itself in Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan’s revolt in 1931 and 1932.  Are there 
lessons the U.S. can learn from the British Mandate experience and their dealings with 
insurgency and revolt? 
Dodge himself argues in his (useful but all too brief) concluding chapter that we 
need to focus more on the development of trust in Iraqi civil society, that we need better 
intelligence, and that we should have a better grasp of the structure of Iraqi society.  All 
these recommendations are sensible; however, treating culture—and insurgency—as a 
system actually leads to recommendations that are more broad-reaching than these.  The 
final chapter of this thesis briefly discusses what follows from treating insurgencies and 
violent movements from a systems perspective so as to add fuel to Dodge’s fire.  For 
now, however, we have accomplished our limited aims of articulating a workable theory 
of culture that reduces it to socially transmitted behavior, analyzed using an open systems 
theory backbone.  Via the use of a historical case study—British administration of Iraq 
during the mandate period—using two recent histories we were able to find evidence that 
many of the troubles encountered by Great Britain were driven by their failure to treat 
culture systematically and seriously.  The next chapter expands in more detail upon one 
particular aspect of culture that deserves great attention: the processes responsible for 
                                                 
21 Dodge, 147–149. 
22 Tripp, 61. 
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shaping and producing the narratives and stories which can in turn serve the purposes of 
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III. CULTURE AND STORIES: TOWARDS A COUNTER-
NARRATIVE STRATEGY 
A. SETTING THE STAGE 
According to the current US National Security Strategy, the Global War on Terror 
is our number one security priority.23  While billions have been spent prosecuting some 
aspects of this war (for example, by attacking state sponsors of terrorism), other aspects 
have been neglected.  This chapter argues that grand counter-terrorism strategy would 
benefit from a comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; understanding 
the narratives which influence the genesis, growth, maturation and transformation of 
terrorist organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for undermining the 
efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups.  Such a 
“counter-narrative strategy” will have multiple components with layered asynchronous 
effects; while effective counter-stories will be difficult to coordinate and will involve 
multiple agents of action, their formulation is a necessary part of any comprehensive 
counter-terrorism effort.  Indeed, a failure on our part to come to grips with the narrative 
dimensions of the war on terrorism, and with the larger concept of culture of which it is a 
part, is a weakness already exploited by groups such as Al Qaeda; we can fully expect 
any adaptive adversary to act quickly to fill story gaps and exploit weaknesses in our 
narrative so as to ensure continued survival.  More than giving us another tool with which 
to confront terrorism, though, narrative considerations also allow us to better deal in 
general with the emerging security threat of violent non-state actors and armed groups.  A 
critical portion of the system responsible for the production and replication of socially 
transmitted behaviors will be that which deals with narratives and stories. 
Justifying the need for and exploring the components of a counter-narrative 
strategy is a task for a book; this chapter briefly sketches only the basics, discussing: (1) 
the psychological aspects of counter-terrorism and why stories will play a critical role in 
the ecosystem of violence, (2) the essential components of a story, (2) a typology of 
narratives offered by nascent terrorist groups throughout their development, (3) a simple 
                                                 
23 See the most recent version, released March 16 2006, and available here: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060316.html. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
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Aristotelian rhetorical model for evaluating story success, (4) principles to guide the 
formulation of counter-narratives, and (5) complications and provisos, as well as a 
consideration of the institutional implications of our position.  This summary is intended 
to provoke thought about new counter-terrorism tools. 
Why think that storytelling has anything to do with terrorism and counter-
terrorism?  Consider the ineliminable psychological aspects of terrorism: there are 
multiple reasons why people choose to form or join organizations which use 
indiscriminant violence as a tactic to achieve their political objectives, all of them dealing 
at some point with human psychology.  People feel alienated from their surroundings; 
they are denied political opportunity by the state; the state fails to provide basic 
necessities; they identify with those who advocate the use of violence; they are angered 
by excessive state force against political opponents; their essential needs are not being 
met; they feel deprived relative to peer groups elsewhere; and so on.  These have all been 
offered as “root causes” of contentious politics in general, and terrorism in particular.  
My purpose here is not to defend any particular position about root causes, but instead 
merely to point out that all these causes have a proximate psychological mechanism—
they exert influence by affecting the human mind/brain.  If stories are part and parcel of 
human cognition, we would also then expect consequently that stories might affect how 
these causes play out to germinate, grow and sustain terrorism. 
 
B. WHAT IS IN A STORY? 
Discussion of stories and narratives is hampered by the fact that there is no widely 
accepted definition regarding just what a story is.  Indeed, an entire school of thought in 
literary criticism (“post modernism”) is predicated on the fact that there is no such thing 
as a necessary and sufficient list of conditions a piece of text must meet so as to be a 
story (be it verbal, written, merely thought in the mind of a target audience, etc.).  We can 
agree with the postmodernists that defining “story” is difficult without thinking, however, 
that the concept plays no useful purpose.  In that sense, the concept “story” is like the 
concept “game”—there is no list of necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to be 
a game, but that does not mean the concept is useless, or that there cannot be “family 
resemblances” between games that it would be useful to consider. 
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A good beginning, then, at a theory of stories comes from the nineteenth century 
German writer Gustav Freytag.  Freytag believed that narratives followed a general 
pattern: there was some beginning, a problem presents itself that leads to a climax, which 
resolves itself into an ending.  A coherent unified story could thus be as short as three 
sentences (consisting of setup, climax, resolution), such as “John was hungry.  He went to 
the store and bought a sandwich.  It was delicious.”  Of course, this particular story is not 
very interesting or compelling, but it nonetheless is a coherent narrative.  This “Freytag 
Triangle,” depicted below, captures the general structure of a story: 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Freytag Triangle24 
 
Contemporary literary theorist Patrick Hogan amplifies on the basic Freytag 
structure, pointing out that most plots involve an agent (normally, a hero or protagonist) 
striving to achieve some goal (usually despite the machinations of an antagonist, or 
villain)--there is a person (or group of persons) and a series of events driven by their 
                                                 
24See Barbara McManus, a teacher of literary theory, at her website about Freytag for more detail 
http://www.cnr.edu/home/bmcmanus/freytag.html. Last accessed, 20 March 2006.  I am indebted to Dr. 
McManus for allowing me to use her Freytag Triangle graphic. 
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attempts to achieve some objective.  This familiar analysis is supported by the study of 
mythology (recall Joseph Campbell’s analysis of the structure of most famous legends 
from antiquity, which involve striving on the part of a hero, a test of some kind, and a 
return to the point of departure with new knowledge and greater self-understanding), and 
by consideration of most forms of story telling, be they oral, written, traditional, or 
contemporary.25,26 
 
C. STORIES AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY 
Using this working “theory of story,” we can gain insight into why stories are so 
important for structuring human thought.  First, note that stories often are rich in 
metaphors and analogies; metaphors, in turn, affect our most basic attitudes toward the 
world.  For example, suppose we think of “Islamic fundamentalism” as a disease; a 
simple narrative about fundamentalist Islam might be: “We want world communities to 
respect human rights.  Fundamentalist Muslims disrespect some of those rights.  We can 
prevent them from doing more harm by taking action now.”  This implies a whole series 
of things which ‘ought’ to be done in reaction to fundamentalism (combat its spread, 
focus on this “public health problem” by inoculating people against it, consider those 
who try to spread it as ‘evil agents up to no good’—or at the very least, as modern day 
“Typhoid Marys,” etc.).27 
Reasoning by metaphor and analogy, a research program explored by Mark 
Johnson, George Lakoff, Giles Fauconnier, and Mark Turner, argues that our most 
complex mental tasks are usually carried out not by the “classical mechanics” of rational 
actor theory (where stories really have no place, or are, at least relegated to the 
background), but rather by a set of analogy making and metaphor mapping abilities that 
                                                 
25 See Patrick Colm Hogan, The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
26 For an interesting (and extremely controversial) take on the role of narrative in “The Arab Mind,” 
see Raphael Patai’s book of the same name (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983, revised edition). 
27 Again, I don’t think the contagion metaphor is necessarily appropriate, even for morally 
objectionable forms of fundamentalist Islam.  But compare some of the rhetoric from Daniel Pipes on his 
website (http://www.danielpipes.org/ Last accessed, 20 March 2006).  For interesting responses to this 
rhetoric, see any of the essays from The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, edited by Emran 
Qureshi and Michal A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
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form the core of human cognition.28  Exploration into the “story-telling mind” is a 
research program that combines metaphor and analogy into an examination of the 
powerful grip narrative has on human cognition; narratives can restructure our mental 
spaces in ways that profoundly affect our reasoning ability and, ultimately, what we make 
of the world.  Think of the grip that the “Jihad versus McWorld”29 narrative has on Al 
Qaeda and how this affects the way they think about the future.30  As Mark Turner notes, 
“Story is a basic principle of mind. Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our 
thinking is organized as stories.”31 
But even if making stories foundational to thought seems a stretch, there’s ample 
evidence that stories influence our ability to recall events, motivate people to act, 
modulate our emotional reactions to events, cue certain heuristics and biases, structure 
our problem-solving capabilities, and ultimately perhaps even constitute our very 
identity.32  Any of these aspects of narrative would be fascinating and important to 
examine in detail. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Classic works here include George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980), Dedre Gentner, Keith Holyoak, and Boicho Kokinov, The 
Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), and Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden 
Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
29 This is the structuring metaphor of Benjamin Barber’s “clash of the world views” book Jihad vs. 
McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).  
See also Huntington’s (in?)famous The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon 
and Schuster, 1998). 
30 See Fauconnier and Turner, or Turner’s The Literary Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
31 Turner, 1.  See also groundbreaking work here by Anthony Patton, unpublished manuscript, The 
World as Story, 2002. 
32 See, e.g., Alicia Juarero, Dynamics in Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), Thomas, 
Casebeer and Kiser, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2005) or Thomas and Casebeer, Violent Systems (INSS Occasional Paper, 2003), Graesser, A. C., & 
Nakamura, G. V. (1982), “The impact of a schema on comprehension and memory.” in H. Bower (Ed.), 
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 16, 59–109 (Academic Press, 1990), Maybel Chau-Ping 
Wong, “The effects of story schemata on narrative recall,” available online at (Last accessed, 20 March 
2006) https://repository.ust.hk/dspace/handle/1783.1/1337 (2004) and Daniel Dennett, “The Self as Center 
of Narrative Gravity,” available online at http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm (1992). 
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Now that we have a basic understanding of what narratives are, and have reason 
to believe they are influential in acts of human cognition salient to terrorist group 
formation, we can examine the role stories play across the life cycle of terrorist 
organizations. 
 
D. NARRATIVES AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LIFE CYCLES 
Terrorist organizations have life cycles.  They have a genesis point, they grow, 
reach maturity, and eventually transform (by dying, being co-opted by the state, 
morphing into a peaceful non-state actor, etc.).  As Thomas and Casebeer33 have pointed 
out, different organizational structures will develop during this life-cycle, with some 
being more important than others depending on where the organization is in its 
development; as Martha Crenshaw has noted, during maturity terrorist organizations will 
develop survival as a goal, and this organizational consideration can help us understand 
why they take some of the actions they do.  The life cycle concept follows naturally from 
thinking of the conditions which give rise to terrorism: there is an environment conducive 
to the formation of violent non-state actors (VNSA hereafter).  These environments are 
typified by failures in governance, pre-existing identity cleavages, resource scarcity and 
deprivation, and lack of political opportunity.  When these “push” factors result in the 
genesis of a potential VNSA (usually at the behest of a foundational “identity 
entrepreneur”), the stage is set for the growth and maturation of a nascent organization.  
At maturity, a VNSA will have developed a suite of functions it must implement if it is to 
maintain its existence as an organization; these include ‘support’ (get resources, cultivate 
stakeholder relations, etc.), ‘maintenance’ (sanctioning defectors from the organization, 
rewarding loyal service, etc.), ‘cognitive’ (planning, learning and control, etc.) and 
‘conversion’ (production of terrorist acts, provision of social services to the community, 
etc.) processes.  A mature organization that is functioning well will have smooth “fit” 
between these processes (this is called “congruence”) and will also have ‘stores of fat’ 
waiting in the wings in case the inputs from the environment turn sour or can no longer 
                                                 
33 See their “Strategic Insights” here  (Last accessed, 20 March 2006) 
(http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/casebeerMar04.asp) and here 
(http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec02/terrorism2.asp), as well as their Institute for National Security 
Studies Occasional Paper “Violent Systems,” available here (http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/occasion.htm). 
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support the organization (these stores constitute what is called “negative entropy”).  The 










































   






   













   






   








Figure 2.   Sub-System Functions in a Terrorist Organization 
 
For present purposes, it is important to note the multiple critical roles narratives 
play throughout this life cycle.  During genesis/gestation, stories (1) provide incentives 
for recruitment, particularly by providing justice frames which serve to mobilize 
discontent, (2) help justify the need for an organization to the community in which it will 
be embedded, and to first-round stakeholders, (3) reinforce pre-existing identities friendly 
to the nascent organization, (4) create necessary identities where none exist, (5) set the 
stage for further growth of the organization, (6) solidify founding members into 
leadership roles, and (7) define the possible space of actions as the organization 
blossoms. 
During growth, narratives do all this and also (1) reinforce role-specific 
obligations so as to ensure group members continue to accomplish their functions, (2) 
provide “fire walls” against attempts to discredit foundational myths, (3) articulate 
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ideological niches for the organization, and (4) make salient to organization members the 
environmental conditions conducive to organizational growth. 
During maturity, in addition, stories will (1) be linked into the command and 
control system of the organization for tweaking and updating, (2) serve as insulation 
against environmental change, (3) actively support operations by motivating 
organizational members and channeling organizational thought down pre-set canals 
useful for the group, (4) be used as “top cover” to allow the organization to adapt, 
change goals, or otherwise modify structure and function so as to ensure continued 
survival. 
During transformation, narratives will (1) smooth the transition to new 
organizational forms, (2) help ease the organization into a different set of stakeholder 
relationships, (3) provide the foundation for the revivified identities which will be used in 
whatever new form the organization adopts, and (4) serve to demobilize those portions of 
the organization which have served their purpose or are no longer needed. 
These purposes deserve elaboration.  No doubt empirical examples come to mind 
for many of them.  A thorough defense would require inductive justification, but for now 
intuitive plausibility must do. 
 
E. A NARRATIVE TYPOLOGY 
While the diversity of purposes served by stories in terrorist organizations makes 
a typology of stories difficult, there are still useful camps into which the stories can be 
grouped.  For instance, foundational myths can be transactional or transcendental.  
Transactional/pragmatic foundational myths emphasize transactional or instrumental 
considerations: if you join our terrorist organization, our use of violence will enable you 
to achieve certain materially realizable individual and collective goals (together we will 
make money; together we will found a new state; together we will change an unjust 
practice).  Transcendental foundational myths emphasize otherworldly goals that it is not 
plausible to expect to see realized or that reject worldly manifestation altogether (together 
we will find paradise in God’s bosom, together we will convert every soul in the world to  
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scientology).  Both can be used in concert, of course.  Al Qaeda’s foundational myth 
involves elements of both: transactional pragmatic goals and transcendental religious 
goals. 
What is the basic structure of some of these stories and narratives?  In his paper 
“Terror’s Mask: Insurgency Within Islam,” political scientist Michael Vlahos identifies 
four elements of Al Qaeda-style narrative tropes: (1) a heroic journey and a mythic 
figure, (2) the rhythm of history captured as epic struggle and story, (3) the commanded 
charge of renewal, and (4) history revealed through and enjoined through mystic literary 
form.34 
According to Vlahos, the foundational mythic figure for Islam is (of course) 
Muhammad.  Bin Laden, then, taps into this theme when he portrays himself as following 
in the footsteps of Muhammad; he too is making a heroic journey, struggling against 
great odds, in a way that makes him almost as mythic in stature (and hence all the posters 
and stickers praising him in places like Pakistan or Afghanistan).  Part of the reason why 
he is mythic is because of the second element: bin Laden argues that he is part of a grand 
struggle against Western imperialism and decadence.  His actions are part of a story that 
is linked to the very fabric of Muslim history (and given the fact that this history was in 
actual fact laced with Orientialism and colonialism, it’s no surprise that charges of neo-
Orientalism and neo-colonialism stick so easily).  The third aspect of the story is 
important: it is only by struggling against these dark forces that one can be renewed.  To 
fail to struggle is to fail to play your part in a narrative that ends with Islam triumphing 
over the infidel West.  Finally, owing to the fourth element, the story contains built in 
“insulation” from temporary tactical successes on the part of occupying forces: the 
mystical element of the narrative (especially its otherworldly component involving things 
like rewards in the afterlife’s paradise) means that temporal success won’t necessarily 
‘defuse’ the logic of the story…resistance can and should continue even if the security  
 
                                                 
34 Occasional paper, Joint Warfare Analysis Department, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins 
University, May 2002.  Available online (Last accessed, 20 March 2006) at 
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040429/50b2e2a45cf24e5cd381ca9033eace97/Terror%20s%20
Mask%20-%20Insurgency%20within%20Islam%20-%20Michael%20Vlahos%20(JHU-
APL%20May%202002).pdf.  Again, note the similarity to parts of Campbell’s corpus. 
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situation improves in the short term (although brute facts about human psychology may 
undermine the effectiveness of that story in the long run in the face of improvements in 
the procurement of basic needs). 
Closely related to Vlahos’s ideas about the essential elements of the Islamic 
fundamentalist narrative is sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer’s theory of “cosmic war.”35  
Juergensmeyer suggests that religious tropes are more likely to play a narrative role if the 
confrontation between two groups can be characterized as a cosmic struggle or battle.  
This is most likely in the following circumstances: 
1. If the struggle is perceived as a defense of basic identity and dignity. 
2. If losing the struggle would be unthinkable. 
3. If the struggle is “blocked” and cannot be won in real time or in real 
terms.36  
To amplify: in cases where the struggle is over extremely basic questions of 
identity and where basic human rights are at stake; if losing the struggle seems 
Armageddon-like (e.g., you would tell a very bad story if your resistance failed); and if 
the struggle is perceived as being hopeless in concrete terms (e.g., it is impossible to see 
how we could beat the occupiers using traditional “force-on-force” confrontations), then 
it is very likely that the struggle can more easily be framed in religious and robustly 
metaphysical terms as a “cosmic” struggle, in which case recruitment into organizations 
becomes easier for certain target populations (those predisposed to accept transcendental 
foundational myths). 
There are no doubt multiple narrative structures at play in terrorism, but hopefully 
this brief survey has motivated the idea that breaking them up into different types can 
help us better understand how we can render inert the role they play in terrorist 
organizational growth.  How do we go about countering these stories? 
 
                                                 
35 Critically, this is one of the characterizations of Islam that Qureshi and Sells object to in the first 
essay in their edited collection. 
36 See especially chapter eight of his Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence, 3rd Edition (University of California Press, 2003). 
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F. COUNTER-NARRATIVE STRATEGIES 
To address this practical question, we will first discuss counter-narrative 
strategies in generic terms, and then offer guidance that is more concrete.  Important 
generic principles for counter-narrative strategy will include: competing myth creation, 
foundational myth deconstruction, creation of alternative exemplars, metaphor shifts, 
identity gerrymandering, and structural disruption. 
Myth creation involves the weaving together of the narrative elements of a story 
with facts about past and present situations to create an emotionally compelling 
background that very often directly influences the susceptibility of a population to 
manipulation by “myth mongers.”  The fanatical devotion shown by al Qaeda operatives 
stems in large part not from any rational deliberative process but rather from the success 
Osama bin Laden and others have had in fashioning a coherent and appealing 
foundational myth.  The events of September 11 can be thought of as the punch line of a 
chapter in an epic that sets “the warriors of God” against an “infidel West.”  This myth 
did not propagate itself via rational actor channels, but instead was indoctrinated via a 
multi pronged effort on the part of fundamentalist strains of Islam (such as Saudi 
Arabia’s Wahhabis).  Successful myth creation may very well leverage heuristics and 
biases cognitive scientists tell us are present in human cognition; they certainly takes 
advantage of the availability heuristic, as this heuristic probably undergirds human 
propensity to form stereotypes. 
Myth creation usually involves the effective use of narrative.  As we formulate an 
“affective strategy,” we should keep the elements of a narrative in mind, for it is only by 
disrupting the story that you can interfere with myth creation.  Good stories need 
protagonists, antagonists, tests for the protagonist, a promise of redemption, and a 
supporting cast of characters (at the very least).  Disrupting al Qaeda’s foundational myth 
may involve undermining the belief that we are the antagonists in the narrative bin Laden 
is constructing.  Therefore, either we can undermine the foundational myth being used to 
drive VNSA development, or we can construct an alternative myth that is a “better story” 
than the one being offered by the myth mongers.  Examples of myth creation in action in 
fiction include the stories told by the rulers of Plato’s ideal city (the “Republic”) that 
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were designed to motivate members of the different classes,37 and in fact the foundational 
myths that supported the violent actions of both the Hutus and the Tutsis during the 
Rwandan massacres of 1994.38 
For a more benign example, consider the conscious mythmaking that has taken 
place in Israel, such as the “transformation of the 1920 defense of a new Jewish 
settlement in Tel Hai into a national myth,” turning a defeat into a symbol of national 
revival.39 
Closely related to myth making is the strategy of creating alternative exemplars.  
Members of an at risk population often become at risk because of a failure to identify 
with a member of a non violent non state actor or a member of the government or 
occupying power.  VNSA “identity entrepreneurs” can exploit existing ethnic, racial, 
economic, or social political differences by elevating someone who shares the same 
characteristics as the exploited class to a position of prestige or power.  Members of the 
at risk group then come to identify with that exemplar and may feel compelled to adopt 
the violent strategies advocated by the exemplar’s VNSA.  Creating alternative exemplars 
that share the salient characteristics who nonetheless do not advocate violence or who can 
show the way towards a non-violent solution to the issues that are fueling VNSA 
emergence can go a long way towards interrupting the VNSA life cycle.  Alternative 
exemplar creation may involve symbolic acts on the part of the government that tap those 
elements of “hot” emotion-laden cognition and heuristics and biases mentioned earlier.  
An example of the alternative exemplar creation strategy in action is the praise and warm 
endorsement heaped upon John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese guerrilla faction of the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), during his visit to Washington just before                                                  
37 See Book Four of Plato’s Republic (translated by Robin Waterfield, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
38 For more about these myths, see Ryszard Kapuscinski’s The Shadow of the Sun (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2001).  Owing to the (mostly fabricated!) “early history” of the region, the Tutsis were 
viewed as being pastoral patrons (read: rulers) who preside over their clients (read: slaves), the Hutu 
agriculturalists.  Under colonial rule by both the Germans and the Belgians, this foundational myth was 
reinforced, with separate identity cards being issued for both peoples.  The Belgians even went so far as to 
argue that the Tutsi were, racially speaking, more closely related to white people, and were hence a 
superior race, putting in place a quite different but nonetheless related foundational myth.  Needless to say, 
these myths played a large part in the violence that erupted in 1994.  For more, see the report from “Africa 
Action” on the world wide web: http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethcen.htm. Last accessed, 20 March 2006 
39 See Yael Zerubavel’s Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National 
Tradition (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1995). Quoted text is from the back cover. 
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Christmas of 1995; such endorsement was critical for the recruitment and logistics boost 
the SPLA received that enabled Garang’s forces to recapture crucial cities in southern 
Sudan soon thereafter.40  In this case, we encouraged the growth of a VNSA by 
cultivating an exemplar saliently different from the leaders of the Sudanese regime. 
An alternate affective strategy includes fomenting a metaphor shift that affects the 
way in which at risk populations or members of a VNSA frame their actions.  Given the 
power of metaphor to shape human thought, it should come as no surprise that shifting 
metaphors people use to frame worldviews and guide decisions could cause a change in 
their reasoning about the situation.  For example, to convince someone that “cluster of 
cells” is a more appropriate metaphor for an unborn embryo than “young human” may 
very well change their stand on the issue of abortion.41  Shifting metaphors requires 
making connections between the way people presently view a situation or issue and the 
way you would like them to frame the situation or issue.42 The common refrain, “one 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” is a simple example of metaphor shift; 
if you can make the charge of “you are not a freedom fighter” (or “you are not actually 
crusading on behalf of true Muslims”) stick, you go a long way toward defusing certain 
narratives.43  Even the patriotic revolutionaries participating in the Boston Tea Party were 
viewed as criminals and dangerous insurrectionists by many of their fellow colonialists. 
Manipulation (nothing necessarily nefarious is meant by this term…ethical issues 
in counter-narrative strategy are another fascinating topic altogether) of existing identities 
(be they national, tribal, ethnic, etc.) is yet another affective strategy.44  This does not 
                                                 
40 See Bill Berkeley, The Graves are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa (New 
York: Basic Books, 2001), 224–225. 
41 See Paul Churchland’s “Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues” (as reprinted in 
Branquinho’s (ed.) The Foundations of Cognitive Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)).  
See also William Casebeer’s “Moral Cognition and its Neural Constituents” (Nature Reviews Neuroscience 
4, 2003) and chapter five of William Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and 
Moral Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 
42 See Fauconnier and Turner for more advice here regarding how to enable these “frame shifts.” 
43 Consider, for instance, the conceptual shift that occurs in members of the Israeli army when they 
start thinking about Palestinian teenagers as being an enemy rather than a peer.  See chapter 5 of Eyal Ben-
Ari’s Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (New York, 
Berghahn Books, 1998). 
44 Daniel Byman has an excellent discussion of this process in his book Keeping the Peace: Lasting 
Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 100–124. 
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necessarily require creating new foundational myths or alternate exemplars; instead, 
skillful use of existing cleavages can decrease a VNSA’s stock of negative entropy.  This 
is the “flip side” of the identity entrepreneur’s efforts that are often part of the genesis 
and growth of VNSA.  For example, the Masaai warriors in Tanzania have skillfully 
manipulated existing identity cleavages so as to elevate the warrior aspect of Masaai 
culture over other aspects (pastoral herder or Tanzanian citizen).  This involved the 
creation of camps for young Masaai; following their circumcision ritual, Masaai males 
attend the camp, learn compelling stories, and become engaged in foundational myths 
about ancient Masaai warriors while cultivating their hunting and combat skills.  The 
Tanzanian government, if it wished, could exploit other aspects of Masaai history, 
including the fact that their lineage includes an important pastoral element, so as to de-
emphasize the violent aspects of Masaai culture to ensure they remain a peaceful non-
state actor.45 
For an Islamic example, consider Bassam Tibi’s position that moderate members 
of the Islamic faith (especially Sufis) could best confront malignant forms of 
fundamentalism by emphasizing strands in Islamic narrative history that highlight very 
different exemplars.  As he says: 
…I am a Sufi, but in my mind I subscribe to aql/reason, and in this I 
follow the Islamic rationalism of Ibn Rushd/Averroes.  Moreover, I read 
Islamic scripture, as any other, in the light of history, a practice I learned 
from the work of the great Islamic philosopher of history Ibn Khaldun.  
The Islamic source most pertinent to [my] intellectual framework is the 
ideal of al-madina al-fadila/the perfect state, as outlined in the great 
thought of the Islamic political philosopher al-Farabi.  Al-Farabi’s 
“perfect state” has a rational, that is, secular order and is best administered 
by a reason-oriented philosopher…A combination of these Islamic 
sources, the Sufi love of Ibn ‘Arabi, the reason-based orientation of Ibn 
Rushd, the historicizing thought of Ibn Khaldun, and al-Farabi’s secular 
concept of order, seem to me the best combination of cornerstones for an 
Islamic enlightenment.46 
                                                 
45 Various interviews, Masaai nationals in Tanzania, June 2002.  For more background on Tanzania’s 
history, as well as detail on the Rwandan situation, see also Taisier Ali and Robert Matthews (eds.), Civil 
Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1999). 
46 The Challenge of Fundamentalism (Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1998), xv. 
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To get yet more concrete, consider the elements of typical narratives offered by 
Islamic insurgents.  For Vlahos, those included a heroic journey and mythic figure, an 
epic historical struggle, a charge of renewal, and a mystic interpretation of history.  Any 
action (including a speech act…merely saying things differently might be enough in 
many cases!) we can take that would decrease the probability that bin Laden could be 
interpreted as a hero, that diminishes the likelihood that we could be cast as the 
antagonist in a historical struggle, that makes it seem less likely “resisting” us would lead 
to Islamic renewal, or that diminishes bin Laden’s ability to sell a mythical interpretation 
of the struggle, would be effective at defusing the power of the story.  For example, part 
of the reason why Brigadier General David Petraeus’s 101st Airborne has been so 
successful in northern Iraq has to do with the careful manner in which they have carried 
out police raids, going so far as to rebuild house doors busted down even when those 
doors were on houses that did in fact contain things like insurgent weapons.  This has 
done much to disarm the justice frames at play in the story-sphere there.47 
Or consider Juergensmeyer’s list (is the struggle over basic identity?, is losing the 
struggle unthinkable?, and can the struggle not be won in real terms?).  Are there actions 
we can take, or speech acts we can engage in, that lessen the threat our presence poses to 
Islamic identity?  Can we assure the populations of a country or region we are occupying 
that successful occupation would not imply the destruction of cherished values?  Can we 
engage in “cultural confidence building measures” that ensure target populations they can 
achieve many of their goals even within the context of occupation or reconstruction?  
These actions may be as simple as avoiding certain terms in our speech (such as 
“crusade”), while other actions required to see a story through may be quite complicated. 
Of course, in many cases the tactical success achieved by taking action we know 
full well may feed a malignant narrative may nonetheless justify them.  But even then, we 
should be aware of the impact our actions are having on the “telling of stories” in the 
backstreets and communities of at-risk populations so that we can, where possible, 
mitigate any negative upshot.  
 
                                                 
47 Author’s oral interview, 2005. 
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G. A SIMPLE EVALUATIVE MECHANISM: ARISTOTLE’S RHETORICAL 
MODEL 
In practice, effective counter-narrative strategy will require understanding the 
components and content of the story being told so we can predict how they will influence 
the action of a target audience.  In other words, we need a sophisticated understanding of 
strategic rhetoric.  This is difficult to come by.  Nonetheless, even well-worn and simple 
models of this process, such as that offered by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle in 
his Rhetoric, can be very useful for structuring our thinking.  Aristotle would have us 
evaluate three components of a narrative relative to a target audience: (1) what is the 
ethos of the speaker/deliverer?, (2) what is the logos of the message being delivered?, and 
(3) does the message contain appropriate appeals to pathos?  Consideration of ethos 
would emphasize the need for us to establish credible channels of communication, 
fronted by actors who have the character and reputation required to ensure receipt and 
belief of the message.  “You have bad ethos” is merely another way of saying “You 
won’t be believed by the target audience because they don’t think you are believable.”  
Consideration of logos involves the rational elements of the narrative:  is it logical?  Is it 
consistent enough to be believed?  Does it contain (from the target’s perspective) non-
sequiters and forms of reasoning not normally used day-to-day?  Finally, pathos deals 
with the emotional content of the story.  Does the story cue appropriate affective and 
emotive systems in the human brain?  Does it appeal to emotion in a way that engages the 
whole person and that increases the chances the story will actually motivate action? 
Thomas Coakley summarizes the Aristotelian model in his paper on the Peruvian 
counter-terrorism experience: 
Ethos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience to establish 
credibility.  Essentially, ethos is what a speaker uses—implicitly or explicitly—to 
ensure that the audience can trust him or her.  An example in advertising is an 
athlete endorsing an athletic product.  In war, examples include a history of 
adherence to LOAC and an assertiveness of willpower.   
Pathos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience’s emotions.  An 
example of this would be an advertisement for tires that emphasizes safety by 
portraying an infant cradled within the circle of the tire.  In war, pathos might be 
displayed by showing the “average” guy on the adversary’s side that the US 
position is better. 
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Logos: these are appeals to facts.  More doctors recommend toothpaste X than 
any other brand.  In war, there is no greater logic than firepower, but as 
insurgencies demonstrated throughout the twentieth century, firepower (logos) 
alone will not win wars, and will win very few arguments.48 
Some of these Aristotelian considerations will be affected by structural elements 
of the story (Is the story coherent?  Is it simple enough to be processed?  Can it be 
remembered? Is it easy to transmit? If believed, will it motivate appropriate action?)49; 
others will be affected by content (Does the narrative resonate with target audiences?  Is 
the protagonist of the story a member of the target audience’s in-group?  Is the antagonist 
of the story a member of a hated out-group?).50 
Needless to say, ascertaining how these issues interact to ensure success in 
counter-narrative efforts is a complex process.  In general, though, consideration of these 
ideas leads us to this non-exhaustive list of basic strategic principles for the formulation 
and application of counter-narrative strategy, some of which we’ve already briefly 
discussed. 
 
H. NARRATIVE “STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES,” AND SOME 
COMPLICATIONS 
Effective counter-narrative strategy will be guided by these strategic principles: 
1)  Target audience characteristics are critical.  Formulating a narrative 
without understanding the culture of the population you wish to influence is a recipe for 
ineffectiveness at best and in the worst of cases can backfire altogether. 
2)  Darwinian competitiveness counts.  Stories will be more likely to be 
received and understood if they are fit for the environment in which they are expected to 
                                                 
48 Thomas Coakley (Captain, US Air Force), “The Argument against Terror: The Peruvian 
Experience, Globalization, and US Policy” (Institute for National Security Studies research paper, 2003). 
49 Indeed, some structure and content of stories may cause narratives to act as primary reinforcers—
that is, just like food, drugs, or sex.  A fascinating neurobiological exploration of this process of successful 
“cultural messaging” is being carried out by Casebeer and neuroscientists such as Read Montague, head of 
the Baylor College of Medicine’s Human Neuroimaging Laboratory.  Innovative new techniques such as 
‘hyperscanning’ allow social cognition to be studied in vitro at the neural level using functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging. 
50 It may very well be that some aspects of narrative are evaluated in exactly the same way that 
theories in the sciences are evaluated: according to their simplicity, output power, explanatory power, 
justificatory power, coherence, breadth, clarity and psychological plausibility. 
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flourish.  Some basic considerations include whether or not stories take advantage of 
heuristics and biases (for example, memorable events will be easier for a target audience 
to recall; hence, memorable events should form the skeleton of a story). 
3)  Aristotle is better than nothing.  Considerations of ethos, logos and pathos 
are simplistic.  But they are better than not bothering to evaluate the storyline at all.  
Relative to a target population, an “E/L/P analysis” can provide a baseline for predicting 
and controlling narrative flow over the course of a conflict. 
4)  There are two important story sets: the ones our adversary is telling, and 
the one being told implicitly and explicity by us.  Terrorist organizations have 
instrumental incentives to “get out the story”—this is a necessary part of their continued 
survival and enables their goal achievement.  We need to consider not only whether our 
story is being told well, but also how both our actions and storytelling affect the 
plausibility of the stories they are introducing into the environment.  To do this well 
requires getting inside the “narrative OODA-loop” of our adversary. 
5)  Tactical success may require overriding strategic story considerations.  
While grand counter-terrorism strategy will require counter-narrative considerations for 
success, it may very well be that strategic story considerations will be overridden in many 
circumstances by demands for tactical or short-term success.  Understanding this tension 
will nonetheless enable us to build stories that will be only minimally affected by such 
reversals. 
6)  Stories with firewalls are better than stories without defenses.  Our 
narratives need to come equipped with an immune system.  Some stories are more 
resilient than others to changes in the environment; the best of stories will make sense 
come what may…to use Karl Popper’s language, it will fail to be falsified.  We should 
think about what we can do to firewall our stories to prevent their destruction or 
cooptation. 
7)  Adaptability and flexibility are important.  The story environment is fluid; 
our stories should be too.  While it would undermine our ethos to change stories often, 
our logos may demand that we do so at times.  Anticipating this, we should create grand 
narratives that have some built-in adaptability and flexibility.  Protagonists and 
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antagonists change.  Basic plot lines shift.  Culmination points move.  Critical identities 
are fluid.  This environmental uncertainty makes adaptability in stories all the more 
important. 
Application of these strategic principles for story formulation will be difficult.  At 
any given time, there will be myriad target audiences.  We can expect their reactions to 
be shaped dynamically.  For example, a grand narrative that was perfectly plausible 
before Abu Ghraib may be rendered perfectly inert afterwards.  A few critical slips by 
key public representatives may entrench an antagonistic narrative, leaving us no choice 
but to abandon a counter-narrative put in place to combat it.  Understanding the temporal 
mechanics and dynamics of story flow will be a messy, learn-as-you-go business.  
Recognizing this fact, however, and considering what impact this has for our plans, 
programs and policies, is far superior to the alternative of letting our adversaries occupy 
the narrative high ground.  
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Doing the things just discussed requires (at the least): an awareness of the 
characteristics of target audiences, knowledge of the narratives and stories at play in their 
culture, a model of how our actions will interact with the characteristics of those 
narratives to produce certain results (even the relatively mundane Aristotelian model just 
discussed is a fine place to start) and a willingness to then coordinate actions inter-
governmentally so that we present a unified narrative front to the target audience. 
The organizations and processes needed to do this successfully are not (alas) in 
place.  Cultural intelligence is only now getting off the ground.  Awareness of the cultural 
and societal impact of occupation is being enhanced systematically relatively late in the 
game.  It is not obvious where in the government’s national security apparatus “narrative 
unification” and “story consistency checks” would take place (presumably at high levels 
such as within the National Security Council, or high-level working groups within the 
State Department).  Given extant concerns about the misuse of psychological operations, 
and the public relations disaster of previous efforts in this direction (such as the proposed 
but hastily shelved “Office of Strategic Influence” in the Pentagon), this lack of 
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institutional inertia is perhaps understandable.  Even so, we are slowly coming to realize 
the importance of counter-narrative strategies, as last month’s Defense Science Board51 
report on “Strategic Communications”makes abundantly clear with its strong final 
recommendation (italics in original): 
The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and 
operations have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure 
collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions and with 
theater security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM’s and 
U.S. SOCOM’s Information Operations responsibilities to include DoD 
support for public diplomacy. The Department should triple current 
resources (personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for 
DoD support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations 




Having in place effective counter-narrative strategies will not be a panacea.  
Nonetheless, if military force is to play the appropriate role in our national security 
strategy and the “Global War on Terror,” we need a more comprehensive understanding 
of how a failure to tell good stories can lead to an increased risk of insurgencies, violent 
social movements, and terrorist action.  While this paper has been far too brief to provide 
a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between stories, identity, and violent 
action, I hope it has at least made plausible the case that we need to think much more 
carefully about the relationship between this rhetorical Clausewitzian trinity and state 
power.  A grand counter-terrorism strategy that actually produces the results we desire 
rides on such a subtle psychologically informed understanding of narratives and terror. 
Narratives also play a critical role in several other cultural phenomena relevant to 
the study of terrorism and insurgency; these include cultivation of shared group identities 
and surrogate consciousness.  This exploration is the subject for the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
                                                 
51 Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.  
The report is well worth reading in its entirety. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
52 Strategic Communications, 17. 
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IV. NARRATIVE, IDENTITY, AND SURROGATE 
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE CASE OF HIZBALLAH 
A. FRAMING AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
There is little doubt that framing processes—those processes responsible for 
influencing how an actor views the world, such as the narratives discussed last chapter—
play an important role in creating and sustaining social mobilization processes in the 
Middle East.  More controversially, framing processes are also critical for sustaining 
organizational efficiency; when movements spawn formal organizations, those 
organizations will take advantage of some of the same processes used by mobilization 
leaders so as to shore up support from actors interested in seeing the organization achieve 
its goals.  Moreover, when organizations find themselves in turbulent and problematic 
environments, they may shift their framing processes so as to cultivate new stakeholder 
relationships and broaden the base of those willing to provide material and moral support.  
Often, this will involve expanding the goals of the organization, providing existing 
members reason to support these new goals by developing a sense of shared 
responsibility for the fate of those affected by these new objectives—in short, by 
cultivating “surrogate consciousness” in their traditional membership. 
Such, this chapter argues, has been the fate of Lebanon’s Hizballah.  This chapter 
argues for a series of linked hypotheses, all germane to the concept of strategically 
important culture.  First, it distinguishes the concept of surrogate consciousness from 
related psychological processes involved in framing.  Surrogate consciousness arises 
from the conjunction of empathetic responses with a ‘thin’ sense of shared identity 
(especially identities that arise from a recognition of common fate) even in the face of 
obvious and self-acknowledged out-group distinctions; it is different from the activation 
of either empathy or identity alone, and may deserve to be recognized as a significant 
category (akin to oppositional consciousness) in the mobilization literature, as it can play 
a critical role in broadening an organization’s base of support.  Development of surrogate 
consciousness is enhanced by consideration of the narrative elements of the framing 
process.  Second, by analyzing official documents of Hizballah and the rhetoric of 
Hizballah leaders such as Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 
40 
Hussein Fadlallah—focusing in particular on how this verbiage has changed over time—
the chapter provides evidence that the Party of God has broadened its goals; this in turn 
has led to narrative efforts designed to boost surrogate consciousness in the Shi’a of 
Lebanon for the plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories.  Third, and only very 
briefly, it argues that whether this is a positive development remains an open question; on 
the one hand, these developments increase the chances Hizballah will continue to develop 
a bona fide constituency and moderate its goals so they become irredentist rather than 
millenarian, making it all the more likely those goals can be achieved by peaceful 
political means.  This may have the pleasant upshot of marginalizing the militant wing of 
Hizballah.  On the other hand, if Palestinians are unable to reach accommodation with 
Israel through non-violent means (such as the peace process), the surrogate consciousness 
could retrench Hizballah’s militant elements, which would not be a favorable 
development.  This is an ambitious set of hypotheses to develop and defend in one 
chapter.  This chapter’s aim is to provide enough explanation and evidence to at least 
make them plausible so as to motivate a more rigorous research agenda. 
 
B. SURROGATE CONSCIOUSNESS 
First, an elaboration and defense of the idea of surrogate consciousness within the 
context of the framing literature.  In general, mobilization (be it for peaceful or violent 
collective action) is thought to happen at the intersections of political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes.53  There must be some form of political 
opportunity (or lack thereof)—for instance, a state crackdown on a spontaneous protest 
might open the political door for a full-fledged movement.  Mobilizing structures provide 
resources for movements to grow and expand—for example, pre-existing social networks 
may serve as funnels for financial support for a nascent movement.  Finally, framing 
processes can (among many other things) motivate individuals to join nascent 
movements, groups and organizations, and may reinforce certain identities so as to make 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), or Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Toward an 
Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution,” in Lichback and Zuckerman (eds), 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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mobilization easier.54  Critical to the importance of frames is the notion that they can 
resonate to greater or lesser degrees with target audiences.55 
Generally, social psychological facts (such as the development of group identity, 
or of awareness of one’s self as a part of a larger collective) are most likely to intervene 
upon the mobilization process via framing effects.  Consider the idea of oppositional 
consciousness.56  Oppositional consciousness is one process whereby members of a 
persecuted or oppressed group become aware of themselves as group members for the 
purposes of spurring action.  Oppositional consciousness—“…an empowering mental 
state that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform or 
overthrow a system of human domination…”—involves, according to Jane Mansbridge, 
“…identifying with members of a subordinate group, identifying injustices done to that 
group, opposing these injustices, and seeing the group as having a shared interest in 
ending or diminishing those injustices.”57  Framing will affect all these facets of 
oppositional consciousness.  Justice frames, for example, will make salient to a group the 
injustices being done to them; while motivational frames will increase the likelihood a 
member of the affected group will take action to end the injustice. 
Surrogate consciousness is similar to, but separate from, oppositional 
consciousness.58  Like oppositional consciousness, surrogate consciousness will be 
                                                 
54 While I don’t have space to defend this assertion here, “framing” probably really serves as a 
placeholder for all non-rational psychological processes involved in mobilization (the sociology and 
political science literature tends to call these “subjective processes,” though this is a bit limiting as the 
psychological processes undergirding these phenomenon need have no experiential or phenomenological 
component, and are in many cases richly social).  I suspect that there are more psychological processes 
worthy of consideration than those identified in the extant literature. 
55 See D. A. Snow and R. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” in B. 
Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow (eds.), From Structure to Action (Vol.1, pp. 197–217; Greenwich: JAI 
Press, 1988). 
56 For excellent discussion, consult A. Morris and N. Braine, “Oppositional consciousness: the 
subjective roots of social protest,” in J. Mansbridge and A. Morris (eds.),  Social Movements and 
Oppositional Consciousness (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
57 From the “Introduction,” in Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (eds.),  Oppositional 
Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 6.  
Also available online at: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/mansb/oppositional_consciousness.pdf. Last 
accessed, 20 March 2006. 
58 In order to confirm that surrogate consciousness was not already a commonly used concept in the 
mobilization literature, I skimmed multiple seminal articles from the framing and identity bodies of work.  
Also, a Google search turned up no academic uses of the phrase, nor did a JSTOR search turn up any 
salient references.  My apologies to the original discoverer if the phrase does turn out to exist in prior art! 
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affected by framing.  It will involve some of the same processes as oppositional 
consciousness, and in many regards functions just as it does—to prepare members of a 
group for action.  But unlike oppositional consciousness, surrogate consciousness 
involves action by members of an out-group on behalf of another group that is being 
prosecuted.  Oppositional consciousness involves the development of empathy, but such 
empathy is shared only with in-group members (indeed, this is what makes it oppositional 
rather than merely generally empathetic).  In the case of surrogate consciousness, 
however, empathy is developed for another group even when one recognizes that one is 
not in fact a member of that group. 
To summarize, according to our nascent theory, surrogate consciousness arises 
from the conjunction of empathetic responses with a very shallow sense of shared 
identity (especially identities that arise from recognition of common fate, which is 
probably the identity generating mechanism which generates the thinnest, most violable 
sense of identity59) whilst nonetheless recognizing the existence of obvious out-group 
                                                 
59 See Leonie Huddy, “Group Identity and Political Cohesion,” in David Sears et al (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), for a review of major 
theories of the development of group identity.  On the whole, social context is critically important for racial 
and ethnic acculturation vis-à-vis group identity.  This is no surprise, as there is an entire theory (called 
“social learning theory”) dedicated to the role that social and group interaction plays in the development of 
attitudes and skills.  Social learning theory was most comprehensively articulated by Albert Bandura in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Bandura placed special emphasis on how new behavior is acquired through 
observational learning via cognitive processes.  Social learning did not require that there be rewards and 
punishments for learned behavior to occur (as in the neo-behaviorist paradigm that dominated cognitive 
science in the early twentieth century); rather, all that was required were the “minimal components of 
attention to a behavioral sequence, retention of its form, and the ability to reproduce the behavioral 
sequence.”  The core components of personal cum group identity are learned, on this picture, and such 
behavior as prejudice or discrimination (or even a willingness to resort to violence to solve problems) is 
transmitted through various social groups—primarily via story telling—because children hear and see such 
attitudes in action in their peers, parents, and authority figures.  It is easy to see how the development of 
prejudice, which may be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for organized violence to be 
committed against out-groups, is contingent upon cultural and social factors themselves tightly related to 
narratives. 
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distinctions.60  Some homely empirical examples may help.  Steve notices that 
homosexuals are being subtly discriminated against in my neighborhood; despite the fact 
that Steve is a heterosexual, he nonetheless acts on the behalf of the gay community by 
attending gay pride parades and donating money to the International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission, perhaps in part because he fears that he—as a member of a 
minority religion (let’s stipulate that Steve is a Christian Scientist)—may eventually face 
the same persecution.  This would be a classic case of acting out of surrogate 
consciousness. 
 
C. HIZBALLAH: A POTTED HISTORY 
The task for the next section of this paper, then, will be to demonstrate that 
Hizballah has used different framing devices in their rhetoric in an attempt to develop 
surrogate consciousness in their traditional constituency for the purposes of expanding 
their base.  Perhaps they hope to eventually be able to appeal to the members of the group 
on whose behalf they have developed surrogacy.  The group in whom surrogate 
consciousness is being developed includes the traditional subjects of Hizballah: the 
people of occupied southern Lebanon, especially Shi’a.  The group on whose behalf the 
consciousness is being developed includes Palestinians living in the occupied territories.  
                                                 
60 Huddy, 518-521, points out that the four major theoretical approaches regarding the construction of 
group identity (which consist of the cognitive approach, realistic interest approaches, social identity theory, 
and social constructivist theory) all make somewhat different predictions regarding sources of commonality 
and critical issues around which members may mobilize.  A thumbnail sketch of these approaches will help 
us understand her conclusion.  The cognitive approach to formation of group identity emphasizes the 
importance of self-perception in the development of cohesive groups: individuals become group members 
because they identify with the group and wish to emulate typical group members.  Realistic interest 
approaches stress the common interests that groups share and advance; common fate is thus especially 
critical…if all of Islam is threatened, and we are Muslims, then it is more likely that we will become 
cohesive so as to achieve the common objective of protecting the shared interests of our group.  Social 
identity theorists emphasize the importance of symbolic interactions between groups and potential 
members; group members endorse group memberships because of a need to achieve a positive sense of 
social identity that will differentiate their own group from others.  Social constructivism takes social 
identity one step further: concepts derive their meaning from social practices; this theory stresses how 
social identities form even among strangers so long as enough shared interactions can occur to generate the 
construction of the group as a group.  Huddy, 521, rightly notes that “The cognitive approach predicts 
cohesion among the members of any salient group; realistic interest theory confines cohesion to groups 
whose members share a common fate; social identity theory points to unity among widely stigmatized 
groups, such as low-status ethnic or racial groups, religious sects (etc.), whose members cannot easily pass 
as belonging to a higher status group; and a social constructivist perspective predicts cohesion among 
members who share a common understanding of group membership.”  I’ll briefly discuss these approaches 
later in the main text.  Resolving the tensions between these various theories of group identification is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Part of the reason why Hizballah is taking this action was to prepare the way for being 
acknowledged as a legitimate actor, not just in the Lebanese political scene but also in the 
larger Southwest Asian political arena, and not just for Shi’a, but for all groups that have 
faced injustice in the region.  Or so I hope to demonstrate in the next section. 
Some background on Hizballah is in order.  Hizballah is Arabic for “Party of 
God”; it is a Shi'a political organization that has a militant and sometimes terrorist wing; 
aboriginally, it articulated three main objectives.  First, Hizballah would like to establish 
a Shi'a state in Lebanon modeled directly upon the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Hizballah 
also shares the goal of the destruction of Israel, as well as the objective of neutralizing 
U.S. influence in the region.61 
In the realm of violent militant action, Hizballah’s activities have included several 
high profile terrorist incidents.  In addition to multiple kidnappings in the 1980s, the 
infamous Beirut truck bombing of US Marines, the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, 
and attacks on Jewish community centers and buildings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, 
Hizballah has launched a series of suicide bombings in the occupied territories.62  This 
pre-9/11 chart demonstrates how successfully they executed suicide bombings, being the 
second largest group in terms of aggregate attacks (though it is critical to note that 
Hizballah has since denounced the use of suicide bombings following their involvement 
with them in the mid-1980s):: 
 
                                                 
61 See the Council on Foreign Relation’s report on Hizballah at 
http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/Hizballah.html. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
62 A useful source here is Bruce Hoffman’s “Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian 
Sponsored International Terrorism,” RAND Report R-378-USDP, March, 1990. 
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Figure 3.   Suicide Attacks by Terrorist Groups, 1983–200063 
 
In order to carry out these attacks, Lebanese Hizballah has developed a large and 
robust organization.  It consists of approximately 300 – 500 elite fighters, 3,000 – 5,000 
part time insurgents, and about 15,000 reservists.64 
This infrastructure developed in part owing to the group’s ties to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  In addition to the obvious ideological commonalities given the group’s 
revolutionary goals, Hizballah receives substantial financial support from Iran.  Also, the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has been extensively involved in training and 
organizing Hizballah (their foundational involvement in the early 1980s was critical 
during the group’s initial organization).  Via a series of Syrian airfields, Iran has air 
supply connections to the group.65 
                                                 
63 From “Rational Fanatics,” by Ehud Sprinzak, Foreign Policy, No. 120 (Sep–Oct 2000), 66–73. 
64 See the Council on Foreign Relations report, as well as multiple publications by Anthony 
Cordesman. 
65 The Wikipedia entry on Hizballah is excellent, and provides a good table of organization, 
background, and historical review: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizballah. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
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Social movement theory provides us with insight into how the conditions for 
Hizballah’s genesis developed (in large part, as a reaction to the Shah’s program of 
Westernization).  “Identity entrepreneurs,” such as the group’s spiritual leader Sheikh 
Fadlallah, were instrumental in establishing the organization and moving it through the 
growth phase.  During maturity, the organization carried out militant action; however, as 
some of its realizable political goals were achieved, and as it gained a larger constituency 
via the provision of social services such as education and health care, the organization 
broadened in terms of goals and functions.  Eventually, Hizballah came to have a political 
face, and today the Secretary General of Hizballah is Sheik Nasrallah.  As others have 
noted, “Hezbollah is an active participant in the political life and processes of Lebanon, 
and its scope of operation is far beyond its initial militant one. In 1992, it participated in 
elections for the first time, winning 12 out of 128 seats in parliament. It won 10 seats in 
1996, and now holds 8.”66 
A stakeholder analysis reveals traceability between developments in Hizballah 
capacities and patronage from one of the major stakeholders—Iran.  For instance, Imad 
Munniyah came to dominate the security apparatus of Hizballah, and with his ties to 
Iranian intelligence, he almost certainly used organizational methods from Iran to 
radically increase Hizballah’s effectiveness in the 1980s.  Solid organizational techniques 
and good traceability between activities led to Hizballah’s increasing effectiveness as a 
militant organization, but it also led to their broadening into an organization with a 
legitimate political face as well. 
Classic reinforcing actions were also taken by Hizballah as they eventually 
became the largest single provider of social services in southern Lebanon, displacing 
competitors such as the government of Lebanon (though in many cases the government 
welcomed Hizballah’s assumption of these responsibilities); “niche construction” 
activities like the delivery of health care and food aid are critically important, as they can 
lead to the development of a stable constituency, which in turn may help moderate an 
organization’s more militant tendencies, as I will briefly discuss later.67 
                                                 
66 Wikipedia, Hizballah. 
67 See, e.g., Judith Harik’s “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular 
Support for Lebanon’s Hizballah,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 40 , No. 1 (March, 1996), 41–
67. 
47 
This potted and all-too-brief summary of Hizballah is intended to establish two 
main points: first, that the organization’s goals have broadened as time has passed, 
becoming more politically realistic; and second, that Hizballah has developed a bona fide 
political constituency, whom they represent both in the Lebanese parliament and 
regionally.  These modifications have required Hizballah to broaden their base, which in 
time has led to the articulation of a new narrative designed to generate surrogate 
consciousness.  Before providing textual evidence for this last point, a detour into 
narrative theory will help provide foundations for understanding tropes and themes 
emphasized in Hizballah’s media presence.68 
Any of these aspects of narrative would be fascinating and important to examine 
in detail; for the next few paragraphs, however, I focus on the relationship between 
stories and identity mobilization, as this is a critical aspect of “narrative ecology.” 
 
D. THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY AND SHIFTS IN HIZBALLAH 
RHETORIC 
In order to understand how and why individuals in places like Lebanon eventually 
become members of Hizballah, we need to better grasp both how individual identity is 
formed and how individual identities interact with groups and cultures to shape a sense of 
collective identity.  The literature on both identity formation and identity interaction is 
voluminous; however, some key points from it can usefully inform our analysis. 
Groups of individuals that feel they share a common fate, possess a common 
identity, face a common threat, or have communal needs, are abundant in most 
environments.  In conditions of violence, where governments are failing to provide basic 
safety/security needs (think of Lebanon in the aftermath of the civil war), these 
sometimes latent or “weakly felt” identities are prone to even greater mobilization, with 
the individual increasingly identifying with the competing identity group rather than the 
political state.  That is, in the right kinds of environments, it’s relatively easy for identity 
entrepreneurs—the tellers of stories that speak to questions of fundamental identity—to 
                                                 
68 Several of these paragraphs are taken from portions of an article I co-authored with James Russell 
for “Strategic Insights,” as is most of chapter two of this thesis; the full article can be found here, and 
portions used in the next few pages were written by me:  
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.asp. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
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make headway in motivating people to act in defense of a group, or play a critical role in 
a plot that includes the group as protagonist and some other power as antagonist.  This is 
especially the case when we are told certain stories throughout the formative periods of 
our lives that can easily be recast to provoke a backlash to things like government failure, 
occupation, or reconstruction.69 
The brief review of Hizballah’s history from a few pages ago gives us a priori 
reason to think the narratives they use to do things like shore up stakeholder support have 
evolved over the years.  There is also textual and other media-based evidence for this, 
and some of the narratives seem to have the purpose of creating surrogate consciousness.  
Consider first an interview with Fadlallah (the spiritual leader for Hizballah) from a 1987 
issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies; in the interview, Fadlallah discusses the 
tensions between Palestinians and Shi’a in Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, openly 
acknowledging that “…there was political, material and spiritual weariness; and chaos 
dominated the south as a result of the disorderly Palestinian political expansion which 
interfered both in the internal struggle between political parties and in family 
matters…”.70  This was in response to a question from the Journal regarding why it was 
that some Shi’a in the south apparently viewed the Israel arrival in a positive light.  While 
disputing that all Shi’a felt this way, Fadlallah nonetheless acknowledges that the 
“…Palestinians were expanding in a disturbing way…”71 and that it is in the nature of 
some regional actors to “score points”72 against its rivals in Palestinian-Arab political 
disputes by turning a blind eye to actions they would otherwise condemn (e.g., the Israeli 
invasion of Southern Lebanon). 
Later, Fadlallah is even more explicit that he believes “…that the Arab political 
scene, and particularly the Lebanese scene, is moving to free itself from the burden of the 
Palestine problem.”73  While Fadlallah discusses in this interview that Hizballah has 
                                                 
69 See the literature review in Troy Thomas, Stephen Kiser and William Casebeer’s Warlords Rising: 
Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2005).  Of note, in the right 
circumstances, most any belief system can be radicalized (Christian, Jewish, secular, etc.). 
70 Fadlallah (1987), 4, “Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah: The Palestinians, the Shi’a, and South 
Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 16, No. 2, 3 – 10. 
71 Fadlallah, 3. 
72 Ibid., 3. 
73 Ibid., 6. 
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goals that include the essential elimination of Israel as a political force, and uses this to 
distinguish Hizballah from Amal (which had more limited goals of freeing Southern 
Lebanon from Israeli occupation), he nonetheless is careful to disentangle Hizballah from 
direct connection to the Palestinian cause as such. 
Considerations like this place Hizballah in a bind.  On the one hand, the fact that 
Israel actually completed their withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave Hizballah 
enormous prestige, as Hizballah’s resistance had arguably led to the first successful case 
of resistance against Israeli territorial aggression in the region.  On the other hand, this 
also meant that Hizballah had to find other goals to justify its continued existence as a 
regional political actor; this was complicated by the fact that their provision of social 
services, education, and medical care had broadened Hizballah’s base and contributed to 
their emergence as a political force in Lebanon replete with explicit representative duties. 
In 1991, Hizballah founded their television station, al-Manar (“the Lighthouse”).  
Al-Manar is extremely popular regionally, ranking second only to Al-Jazeera in 
popularity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.74  Al-Manar broadcasts numerous 
motivational videos with stirring slogans and professionally produced graphics and 
music.  These polemic videos serve several purposes, one of which, I contend, is the 
facilitation of surrogate consciousness for the Palestinian plight in Lebanese viewers.  Al-
Manar station manager Nayef Krayem says as much, stating that the station has links to 
multiple militant Palestinian groups (including the military wing of Fatah’s Abu Musa 
faction and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), and that part of the station’s mission is to 
generate material and moral support for the Palestinian struggle against Israeli 
occupation.75  Hizballah deputy secretary-general Sheikh Naim Qassam told Lebanese 
Future Television that Hizballah provides “…national support to the Palestinians through 
                                                 
74 For more background, see Avi Jorisch’s Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television 
(Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004).  Of note, I disagree with many of the 
policy recommendations Jorisch floats in this book, and I recognize that the Washington Institute has a 
“not-so-hidden” agenda.  Even so, the book offers valuable background information, and the CD it contains 
has numerous video clips from station broadcasts which are very interesting and useful. 
75 Jorisch, 34. 
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al-Manar television,”76  and Hussein Nasrallah’s rhetoric in multiple venues has included 
consciousness raising on behalf of the Palestinian struggle.77 
Consider, for example, a video broadcast which includes images of a suicide 
bomber destroying an Israeli checkpoint.  Or in another case, a video shows footage of 
Israeli bulldozers knocking down Palestinian dwellings.  A third video details Palestinian 
suicide bombers who have died while killing IDF members.  These videos emphasize the 
themes that would need to be developed if surrogate consciousness were to appear.  
Recall that (in the case of the development of related oppositional consciousness) the 
group would need to become aware of injustices, identify with the group being repressed, 
and feel the need to redress the injustices; in the case of surrogate consciousness, feeling 
of group belonging does not need to be present, or if it is present it is sustained only by 
common fate considerations and will also probably involve recognition that one is not 
actually a member of the surrogate group.  Videos like these lay the groundwork for all 
these things by raising awareness of injustices done to the Palestinians, by providing a 
means of redressing them (al-Manar broadcasts bank account information for those who 
wish to donate to organizations which support violent action in response, and also 
provides sometime material and moral support to Palestinian organizations such as 
Hamas), and by laying the emotional groundwork for support for things like the second 
Intifada via the use of resonant music and emotion-laden images.78 
One objection is that to assume any particular broadcasts reflect shifts in strategic 
goals of Hizballah would be unjustified; this is probably the case.  For instance, there are 
links between themes emphasized in al-Manar programming and short-term political 
goals related to the Lebanese elections.  Consider, for instance, the period between May 
and September 2000, in which the tone and content shifted to emphasize the Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah’s successful military campaign, and Israeli military 
weaknesses.  The “triumph over Israel” theme was probably related not just to facts on 
the ground about the Israeli/Lebanon situation but also to the upcoming September 2000 
                                                 
76 Jorisch, 34, quoting from an October 22, 2002 document about the broadcast. 
77 Jorisch, multiple videos contained on CD. 
78 Jorisch, 67–70.  I realize these examples don’t necessarily disprove the null hypothesis; they are 
suggestive, however. 
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Lebanese parliamentary elections.79  Even so, the shift in tone and content about the 
Palestinian plight has sustained itself for long enough that the conclusion that this change 
from the attitude of practiced distant concern of the mid-80’s is more than a tactical 
political development has first-pass plausibility.  It passes the sniff test. 
 
E. UPSHOTS OF SURROGACY 
Whether this is a positive development remains an open question; on the one 
hand, it increases the chances Hizballah will continue to develop a bona fide constituency 
and moderate its goals so they become irredentist rather than millenarian, making it all 
the more likely those goals can be achieved by peaceful political means.  This may have 
the pleasant upshot of marginalizing the militant wing of Hizballah.  As Baylouny points 
out in her Strategic Insight “Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in Islamic 
Movements?”80 involvement in democratic institutions has a moderating influence even 
on those who have anti-system goals.  Cultivation of a bona fide constituency tends to 
decrease the likelihood of violent political action, as such cultivation usually involves the 
formation of moderate organizations and institutions designed to minister to the needs of 
this constituency. 
On the other hand, if Palestinians are unable to reach accommodation with Israel 
through non-violent means (e.g, via the resurgent peace process), the development of 
surrogate consciousness could retrench Hizballah’s militant elements, which would not 
be a favorable development.81  Developing surrogate consciousness boosts the 
complexity and interconnectedness of the system; from a policy-making perspective, this 
can be both a good and bad thing, contingent upon how the system as a whole develops. 
Before concluding, let’s acknowledge the multiple limitations afflicting my thesis 
for this chapter.  These include not only space limitations but also my radically 
incomplete survey of Hizballah rhetoric and propaganda, amplified by the complication 
                                                 
79 Jorisch,. 37. 
80 Strategic Insights, Vol. 3, Issue 4, April 2004, available online at 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/apr/baylounyApr04.asp. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
81 Daniel Byman argues in “Hezbollah’s Threat” that we should not crack down on Hizballah itself, 
but should instead focus on undercutting Iranian and Syrian stakeholder involvement.  This, he contends, 
will maximize the chances that Hizballah will fully become a mainstream political actor.  See his article in 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, 64 – 66, November/December 2003. 
52 
that the author does not speak or read Arabic (this is being redressed in the long run).  
The necessary resources weren’t available to distinguish between elite rhetoric and other 
layers of stratification in Hizballah’s organization (a more in-depth study would discuss 
this in detail82).  Nor did the chapter provide a comprehensive review of the political 
context in which Hizballah has been acting.  On the whole, however, despite these 
limitations these linked theses are at least plausible and worthy of further investigation. 
This chapter argued for a series of hypotheses.  First, it distinguished the concept 
of surrogate consciousness from related psychological processes involved in framing.  
Surrogate consciousness arises from the conjunction of empathetic responses with a 
‘thin’ sense of shared identity even in the face of obvious and self-acknowledged out-
group distinctions; it can play a critical role in broadening an organization’s base of 
support.  Second, by analyzing official documents of Hizballah and the rhetoric of 
Hizballah leaders such as Nasrallah and Fadlallah and the al-Manar television station, it 
provided (admittedly slim) evidence that the Party of God has broadened its goals and 
that this in turn has led to narrative efforts designed to boost surrogate consciousness in 
the Shi’a of Lebanon for the plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories.  Third, and 
most briefly, the chapter argued that whether this is a positive development is an open 
question.  It contributes to Hizballah’s maintenance of a constituency, which is a net 
positive, but it could also lead to identification with militant means of resolving disputes 
should the latest incarnation of the Palestinian/Israeli peace process fail.  Irrespective of 
how political events in the Middle East shape—and are shaped by—Hizballah in the 
future, this chapter has driven home the importance of understanding the rhetorical and 
narrative “top cover” movements and organizations use; only by engaging in this 
endeavor in subtle (and sympathetic) ways can we hope to shift the story-telling 
atmosphere in such a manner that peaceful resolutions to political conflict become the 
norm in the region.  In other words, a critical aspect of shifting culture will involve 
understanding how military force produces change in the narratives which shape 
                                                 
82 Consider, for example, Glenn Robinson’s argument (in chapter six of his book Building a 
Palestinian State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997)), that Hamas and the PLO converged in 
their use of symbology even as animosity between elites in the organization persisted.  While I would 
assume that Hizballah elites control al-Manar content, I am not familiar enough with al-Manar’s production 
process to say that with complete assurance.  An interesting and important project would be to analyze elite 
control over Hizballah rhetoric especially in light of use of media like call-in televised talk shows and the 
internet where centralized control of content becomes more difficult. 
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organizational development—this chapter has added empirical heft to the more 
theoretical generalizations of the previous chapter. 
While of academic interest, how can we combine these insights into a useful tool 
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V. THE AT-RISK GROUP IDENTITY INDEX: A USEFUL TOOL 
FOR THE STRATEGIST AND ANALYST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Multiple categories can be used to conceptualize the political ontology of states in 
general, let alone those astride the “arc of conflict” in regions such as Southwest Asia; a 
standard example for the Middle East is “Shia dominated states” (such as Iran) versus 
“Sunni dominated states” (such as Saudi Arabia).  The usefulness of any particular 
categorization varies dramatically with the problem the academician or policy-maker is 
concerned with.  Someone worried about water wars in the Middle East may focus on 
hydrologic features as the touchstone for their conceptual scheme, while a theorist 
studying Arabic literature might focus more on the history of print technology to shed 
light on why some regions had flourishing written legacies while others did not.  Even the 
idea that the thing we must be concerned with categorizing is “states” is laden with 
assumptions--true only in certain contexts--about the importance of the nation-state in 
understanding any particular political phenomenon.  Here, this chapter argues that 
analysts concerned with the potential for non-state political violence ought to pay special 
attention to the group identities especially at risk for mobilization present in a given state; 
compressing the literature and case studies reviewed and discussed in the previous two 
chapters, “At-Risk Group Identity” will be the classification scheme, and it will allow us 
to array states (several are discussed in this essay, focusing especially on the Middle 
East) along a continuum from those containing group identities most ripe for mobilization 
to those where there are few politically salient in-group/out-group distinctions.  
Operationalizing this categorization is difficult, admittedly; this is an especially theory-
laden proposed scheme.  Even if the enterprise ultimately fails to convince, though, my 
hope is that it will nonetheless do so in an illuminating way. 
 
B. BASIC TERMS: “AT RISK” AND “GROUP IDENTITY” 
We can begin by carving the scheme at its joints: what does “at risk” mean and 
how is it measured, and what accounts for the formation of “group identity” and how is it 
assessed?  States with at-risk group identities will be those that measure high on both 
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these axes: there are strong heterogeneous group identities at play in the social and 
political ecology of the area, and these identities feed directly into the mechanisms and 
resources necessary to mobilize them (e.g., Egypt or Iraq).  States with low at-risk group 
identities will be those that measure low on both axes: weak or homogenous group 
identities, little mobilization potential (Libya).  States in between present interesting 
cases: some will possess strong heterogeneous identities with little currently at-risk vis-à-
vis mobilization (Yemen), while others may have high risk factors with little current 
group identification (Kuwait).  Consider first the “at risk” part of the scheme. 
The social mobilization literature offers an interesting perspective on what it 
means for a state to be “at risk” for emergence of a violent non-state political actor.  At 
its core, this body of work postulates three factors which contribute to social 
mobilization: lack of political opportunity, availability of mobilizing resources, and 
presence of mobilizing frames (especially “justice frames”).  The first component of my 
proposed classification scheme focuses on an aggregate measure of these three factors; in 
some cases, this may confound understanding as a state could offer lots of mobilizing 
resources but not be susceptible to a mobilizing frame (arguably, several of the Gulf 
states fit this mold), or vice-versa (Sudan).  While much more synthesis of the literature 
is needed, for present purposes these factors will be weighted in this order: lack of 
political opportunity, mobilizing frames, and then resources.  The theoretical reason for 
this owes to the importance of “pull factors”—if there’s no political opportunity and a 
great framing story to be told, the actors in question will proactively seek to acquire the 
resources necessary to foment mobilization.  Setting aside this ordering for the time 
being, however, we can think of “at risk” on a zero to one scale.  The three factors I just 
mentioned will each be rated from zero to one and then multiplied by each other, giving a 
total at risk rating that drops to zero if any of the three factors drops to zero. 
The second part of the categorization is the “group identity” notion.  Again, to 
bastardize a considerable literature, we can operationalize group identity as “a subjective 
sense of membership usually involving attachments related to social identity or realistic 
interdependence”83  Generally, group identity will evolve via four mechanisms: cognitive 
                                                 
83 See Shelley Taylor, “The Social Being in Social Psychology,” in Gilbert et al’s Handbook of Social 
Psychology, Fourth Edition: Volume One (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 66. 
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(self-perception of group membership is emphasized, usually with an affective emulation 
related component—think of the “I wanna be like you” song from the animated Jungle 
Book), realistic interest (groups which may initially see themselves as separate which 
nonetheless share a common fate will come to see themselves as being part of the same 
group), social identity (which stresses the importance of interaction between group and 
non-group members for group formation, and usually emphasizes the psychological need 
for a positive sense of identity), and social constructivism (which takes social identity a 
step further and stresses the constructed nature of all aspects of identity).84  For a first 
hack, then, we could ask which states have histories and experiences which make it likely 
that groups would self-consciously attempt to emphasize in-group/out group distinctions 
(this would be at play in circumstances where colonial powers attempted to set up proxy 
groups which vied for power…think of many of the Southwest Asian monarchies), where 
groups of people were forced to share a common fate (certainly at work with Kurdish 
identity), where certain markers of identity become especially salient (envision any 
checkpoint along the Israeli/Palestinian Authority border), and where social forces are at 
work to actively construct and reinforce identity every day (think of tribal affiliation in 
Yemen, where weekly qat-chewing parties are de rigueur and tend to reinforce group-
related affiliative bonds) .  So, the “group identity” axis will also range from zero to one, 
with two factors being multiplied together to produce it, both of them weighted from zero 
to one: one factor is whether or not the society is homogenous ( = 0) or heterogeneous ( = 
1), and the other is whether or not group identities are weakly held ( = 0) or strongly held 
( = 1).  At this point, the general outline of the scheme should be clear, even if a lot of 
academic hand-waving is still needed to translate it into an actionable category. 
 
C. MINI CASE STUDIES: EGYPT, YEMEN, AND IRAQ  
To demonstrate the usefulness of this scheme, this chapter will briefly make the 
case for how two contemporary states—Egypt and Yemen—rate using it.  It will also 
discuss a historical case study, that of Iraq and its colonial experience, so as to 
demonstrate its explanatory power.  Keep in mind that the purpose of this category is not 
                                                 
84 See Taylor, 65–70, for more detail; see also Thomas et al, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent 
Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 74–80. 
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to explain all of the events in Middle Eastern history, but rather to enrich understanding 
of why certain groups become politically active and violent at one point rather than 
another.  While the framework is theoretically rich enough such that it should explain 
much of the political violence in the region, also keep in mind that it is not intended to 
explain state-on-state organized warfare, and it may “fall down on the job” as states in the 
region become more democratic (while beyond the scope of this paper to justify or 
discuss in detail, it is likely that the relatively “thin” identities generated in broadly 
inclusive democratic polities, especially those which resist the temptation to  violently 
crackdown on nascent political violence, will not be sufficient to marry-up with the 
mobilization factors in an interesting way). 
Egypt rates high on the “At-Risk Group Identity” scheme.  On the “at risk” side, 
despite the recent Presidential elections (in which opposition candidates, nine in all, were 
allowed to run for the first time), political opportunity is very low.  While it is a 
Revolutionary Republic, and hence would be more concerned about representation if it 
were an exemplar of the type, Egypt’s Mubarak has resisted attempts to make elections 
multi-party and has generally stifled opportunities for political dissent; even civil society 
opportunities are closely monitored, and violent responses to the peaceful provisioning of 
health and medical services by Hassan al-Banna’s  Muslim Brotherhood were the norm 
rather than the exception.  Mobilizing frames are also plentiful; the government’s failure 
to provide adequate social services—witness their impotence even in the capital city of 
Cairo following the 1992 earthquake—makes it easy for Brotherhood members to frame 
their political activity as encompassing an issue of justice, especially when cronyism and 
corruption are present in the government.  Finally, mobilizing resources are available, 
ranging from a professional class that can be siphoned for skills and expertise to an 
economy that, while stagnant, nonetheless provides enough citizens with a standard of 
living such that political engagement is within the realm of conceivability. 
On the “group identity” side, Egypt also rates high.  Given the secular nature of 
the government, an Islamic in-group/out-group distinction is easy to perpetuate, drawing 
on the shared fate and cognitive aspects of the formation of group identity.  Muslim 
Brotherhood activity has led to multiple one-on-one encounters in situations where 
Brotherhood members provide needed services to the poor…the affective component of 
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these relationships reinforces Islamic identity.  In addition, the government’s dependence 
on US aid funneled to governmental elites makes it relatively easy to perpetuate a class 
divide (despite Egypt’s roots in Nasserian socialism), and there may be synergy between 
these class issues and other minority group identities which have been reinforced via 
socialization mechanisms (e.g., Coptic Christians).  The poor living in the City of the 
Dead are a group ripe for mobilization if their access to mobilizing resources were to be 
enhanced by external stakeholders. 
Compare Egypt to Yemen, on the other hand.  Yemen ranks relatively low on the 
“at risk” axis.  Mobilizing resources are not generally available owing to the poverty of 
the nation and its lack of an educational infrastructure; moreover, where mobilizing 
resources are available, they are generally siphoned off to extra-Yemeni organizations 
(such as al Qaeda), such that an indigenous social movement in Yemen never really gets 
traction.  While political opportunity is lacking, Yemen is still recovering from a civil 
war fought in the aftermath of reunification, and the nominally democratically elected 
government is led by a coalition consisting of the leaders of both the former North and 
South Yemen; distractions exist for the population such that perceived political 
opportunity is relatively high.  Finally, the frames at play in Yemen tend not to pit the 
government against the polity but rather tribe against tribe, or, in some cases, Yemeni 
against Saudi (the two countries have had multiple skirmishes along their ill-defined 
border).  This may be changing in light of the government’s dalliance with the United 
States post 9-11 (and with their involvement in violent police crackdowns on the 
kidnapping of tourists), though.  On the “group identity” axis, Yemen ranks medium at 
best; while tribal identity is strong, especially in the Hadramaut region, these identities 
generally do not mesh well with any of the mobilizing resources on the at-risk axis.  In 
addition, the mechanisms responsible for cementing in-group/out-group distinctions have 
the perverse upshot of sapping the energy of the participants, as qat party attendees can 
attest. 
In addition to helping us predict the likelihood of identity-motivated political 
violence in Yemen, this categorization can shed light on past events in the region as a 
move further north to Iraq demonstrates, where British colonial administration of the 
Mandate serves as an interesting case study.  An intelligence official working for the 
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British government in 1920 would have had no problem ranking Iraq “high” on the ARGI 
(At-Risk Group Identity) scale.  On the identity side, Faisal had already stoked Arab 
sentiments during his resistance to Ottoman rule; on the “at risk” side, owing to the 
intrigues of Sykes-Picot, mobilizing frames involving colonial themes would be all too 
easy to draw upon.  While mobilizing resources were hard to come by, they were 
available, and would (perversely) actually be increased by British presence in the 
Mandate as the British cultivated a sheikh-related proxy class (itself actually ill-suited to 
accomplish the economic reforms the British had in mind).  Political opportunity was 
limited owing to British paternalism, and to Orientalist blinders that prevented the British 
from engaging politically with some of the most important actors on the politico-
economic side (such as sarkal intermediaries in native marketplaces).  When 
indiscriminant British airpower reinforced despotic frames at play among the disaffected 
population, multiple rebellions were spawned.85  Viewing the region through an ARGI 
lens could have enabled British planners to better prepare for a humane Mandate 
administration, and hence the connection between this index and the case study discussed 
in much more depth in chapter two of this thesis. 
However, more so than most, the categorization of “At-Risk Group Identity” is 
loaded with conceptual baggage, as this all-too-brief summary makes clear.  It is rather 
precarious, as critical turns of events can quickly change, for example, the efficacy of 
frames used to mobilize group identities towards political violence.  This makes it a 
difficult and contentious category to use.  But on the other hand, for academics and 
policy-makers concerned with non-state political violence, this category is of critical 
importance—it points out (especially for those charged with wielding instruments of state 
power) the importance of psychologically rich concepts such as “identity” and “framing” 
for helping us come to terms with the history of the Middle East so as to forecast and 
influence its future development.  In addition, in an ironic upending of the concept of 
Orientalism, this category may enable us to recognize similar factors at play in our 
American political history and hence may boost awareness that our own story is of a 
                                                 
85 An excellent reference here is Toby Dodge’s Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a 
History Denied (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003).  See also William Casebeer & Barak 
Salmoni, “The Importance of Treating Culture as a System,” American Intelligence Journal, forthcoming 
2006. 
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piece with those of the people of Southwest Asia, even if it differs greatly in historical 
detail; this recognition may prevent overly ambitious (and probably false) “clash of 
civilization”-style worldviews from driving policy. 
 
D. THE ARGI INDEX 
The substance of this chapter can be summarized in the following slide, taken 
from a presentation the author gave at a terrorism conference in November, 2005: the “x” 
axis represents being at risk (AR), and consists of the multiplication of the inverse of 
political opportunity available (INV(PO)) by the availability of mobilizing resources 
(MR) by the presence of mobilizing frames (FR).  The “y” axis represents salient group 
identities (SGI), and consists of the multiplication of a measure of identity heterogeneity 
(HET) by a measure of the strength of group identification (GI). 
 
Figure 4.   At-Risk Group Identity Index 
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There are several interesting things to note about this graph.  First, the nations 
identified in the upper right hand quadrant (the “one/one” states) face active or incipient 
violent non-state organizations (multiple insurgencies for Iraq, a resurgent Sendero 
Luminoso for Peru, the Uigher rebellion for China, and simmering Tuareg and salafist 
Islamic activity for Mali).  Second, the nations in the lower right quadrant face latent 
slow-burning non-state violence, while those in the upper left hand quadrant face latent 
fast-burning non-state violence.  The slow-burners will move in fits and starts into the 
active quadrant only because (generally) the manipulation of identities is a process that 
takes many years—a sudden influx of finances, for example, would not immediately 
change the identity dynamic at play in Yemen.  On the other hand, the fast-burners are 
already “pregnant” on the identity axis, so a sudden influx of mobilizing resources, or a 
gestalt shift in the “frame game” (brought on by a critical event or a harsh government 
crackdown) could put those identities at risk very quickly.  To be provocative, the 
analysis places the United States in this category just to demonstrate that identity politics 
still are a factor in domestic political machinations; if we as a polity were to suddenly go 
insane and repeal parts of the constitution concerned with equal protection of the law, and 
then elect a David Duke equivalent to office, we could (justifiably) experience domestic 
rebellion.  Finally, The “zero/zero” states, one example of which is Iceland—a relatively 
homogenous state with very few justice frames at play—have no violent non-state actor 
(VNSA) activity. 
The ARGI index also highlights policy options for diminishing the likelihood of 
non-state political violence.  For example, in present day Iraq, one of the most important 
things we could do to de-motivate the Sunni-based aspects of the insurgencies is to 
elevate Sunni perceptions that they will be given a genuine chance of political 
opportunity in the new Iraqi regime.  Or, we could ensure that credible regional actors 
with ethos with Sunni target audiences diminish the effectiveness of the justice frames 
which are driving Sunni rebellion.86  Tackling mobilizing resources may be more 
difficult but is nonetheless one facet of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy 
(e.g., by interdicting financial networks related to Sunni VNSA activity, or by identifying 
                                                 
86 See Casebeer and Russell’s March 2005 “Strategic Insight” on counter-narrative strategies, 
available here: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.asp. Last accessed, 20 March 
2006. 
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and isolating individuals with IED construction expertise).  On the identity axis, there are 
actions policymakers can take to consolidate and develop common identities that make 
the development of in-group/out-group divisions more difficult, whether that be by 
emphasizing common aspects of history or ensuring the development of robust social 
capital. 
The ARGI index is one useful tool in our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
“bag of tricks.”  It can usefully help us inform our analysis regarding what nations and 
regions are at risk for the development of non-state political violence, and can also point 
out alternative methods for influencing the genesis of violent non-state actors via non-
traditional uses of the instruments of state power.  While much work remains to be done 
to realize its promise, this index may prove to be a pivotal concept for helping us 
understand political violence in general.  But even if not, it at least forces us to think 
creatively about the causes of political violence, and hence may be useful even if overly 
simplistic. 
The final chapter of this thesis discusses how this framework leads to two 
innovative research programs: one dealing with the neuroscience of terrorism (which 
articulates a research agenda linking cultural issues to the manifestations of culture at the 
neural level), and another concerned to offer practical big-picture guidance for strategists 
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VI. THE NEUROSCIENCE OF TERRORISM, AND STRATEGIC 
FORCE AND CULTURE PRINCIPLES:  
BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the phenomena discussed in the previous chapters are implemented in 
the human mind/brain.  For example, the bulk of a framing process takes place in human 
“mental space”—the mind/brain complex is where much of interest in socially 
transmitted behaviors takes place.  As mentioned before, narratives—and the processing 
of narratives—are mental through and through.  It would be useful, then, prior to 
articulating general principles that bring together force, culture and terrorism, to briefly 
consider how a research program which takes into account the neuroscience of culture—
especially the radicalization process—would be useful to strategists and planners. 
This chapter has two tasks: first, to articulate a research program into the 
neuroscience of terrorism for the purpose of spurring innovation in academic exploration, 
and second, to bring the material of the last several chapters together so as to articulate 
general principles useful in the force and culture change equation. 
 
B. A RESEARCH PROGRAM: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF TERRORISM 
Baldly put, studying the neural mechanisms involved in terrorist recruitment, 
stakeholder support, and small group dynamics may enable improvement of counter-
terrorism activity at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.  Multiple empirical 
“proofs of concept” exist. Accomplishing this integrative work in the cognitive 
neurosciences, the political sciences and the military arts and sciences requires seed 
money and personnel support, though there is the potential for a large payoff on a small 
investment. 
Exploring terrorist psychology is critical for confronting it effectively.  We need 
to enhance current counter-terrorism tools and develop innovative new ones; arguably, 
much current effort is focused on killing/capturing leaders and financial interdiction 
strategies.  While effective, this is a limited perspective.  Insights from all levels of 
analysis are needed.  The causes of terrorism give primacy to the psychological level: 
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terrorists are human beings; their actions are driven by psychological cum 
neurobiological processes.  All of them are important, but three especially so: 
recruitment, stakeholder reinforcement, and small group dynamics leading to 
radicalization.  Understanding the neurobiology of these psychological acts may lead to 
new and effective strategies and tactics to reduce recruitment rates, engender stakeholder 
defection, and prevent group member radicalization.  Low-hanging fruit exist. 
In terms of understanding recruitment: what target populations are vulnerable to 
recruitment efforts?  Why do recruitment efforts succeed?  What elements of recruitment 
efforts are responsible for successful recruitment and prevention of defection?  
Answering these questions will involve understanding cultural messaging.  How do 
marketed messages of many forms affect the neural mechanisms responsible for choice 
behavior?  “Neuromarketing” is a nascent science, but multiple examples exist of 
provocative and successful explorations of these questions.  The Human Neuroimaging 
Lab at the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, TX, has conducted experiments 
identifying the neural signature of marketing effects in a “Coca-Cola versus Pepsi” task.  
These signatures correspond to the successful insinuation of a marketed message into 
reward processing machinery in the brain responsible for everything from addiction to 
motivated choices.  Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging—a brain scanning 
technique that detects increases in the flow of oxygen to the active parts of our neural 
system—has been critical in this effort.  Designing experiments to extend this work to the 
system of terrorism is possible.  What terrorist messages serve as the most successful 
“marketing strategies” and why?  Work in progress is identifying the processes 
responsible for causing some narratives and stories to have such a grip on decision-
making in the human mind.  These story probes are pregnant for variation along multiple 
axes of interest so we can plumb the persuasive force of terrorist messages. 
In terms of understanding stakeholder reinforcement: how do terrorist 
stakeholders (such as state sponsors of terrorism, sympathetic communities, and key 
terrorist group members ranging from leaders to foot soldiers) become involved, and how 
do terrorist organizations reinforce this involvement so it continues?  Proof of concept 
here is in the form of unpublished work on the neural mechanisms responsible for 
preference of certain visual stimuli; initial results indicate simple metrics like frequency 
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of exposure may explain certain preferences.  Frequency of contact may correlate directly 
with degree of sympathy and serve as a reinforcer.  Understanding the neural mechanisms 
of this process could lead to new strategies for causing role-specific defection (think of 
the dividends to be had by increasing the likelihood that key terrorist financiers leave 
terrorist organizations) and diminishing stakeholder support across multiple levels. 
Finally, in terms of small group radicalization: there is a strong relationship 
between social isolation and the social networks produced by going underground and the 
potential for radicalization in an organization.  Why?  What neural mechanisms are 
responsible for this relationship?  How do terrorist cell leaders encourage radicalization 
and develop the trust and charisma that are part of this process?  Proof of concept here 
exists in the form of experiments demonstrating the neural mechanisms of trust 
formation.  Bargaining games in a social setting have led researchers to discover possible 
neural signatures related to the formation of trust and will help researchers understand 
what factors enhance or diminish trust and social-bond formation and maintenance.  This 
may eventually link to the environment of the social encounter and relationship to 
reputation in interesting ways. 
Understanding the neural mechanisms of recruitment, stakeholder reinforcement 
and small group radicalization will enable us to enhance and expand existing 
counterterrorism tools and provide new options at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels.  Recruitment is a critical driver in terrorist group genesis and growth; diminishing 
the effectiveness of recruitment stories and environments will have a large impact on the 
likelihood of terrorism.  Stakeholder reinforcement is critical for maturing terrorist 
organizations; encouraging role defection among key group members can diminish 
terrorist operating capacity and undercut important sources of support.  Preventing small 
group radicalization from happening, and modifying the environments of operation for 
such groups will diminish the chances that disaffected groups will actually choose 
indiscriminant violence as a tactic.  This work lays the basis for conducting defense in 
depth by potentially making another profiling tool available to homeland security teams 
and intelligence collection experts. 
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C. FROM THE NEURAL LEVEL TO BIG-PICTURE FORCE, STRATEGY 
AND CULTURE CONSIDERATIONS: SYSTEMS, CULTURES, AND 
TERROR 
The final major section of this chapter briefly discusses what follows for strategy 
from treating insurgencies and violent movements from a systems perspective and with 
requisite sensitivity to culture. 
To ensure we consider the full range of policy options available for confronting 
political violence, the chapter offers the following list of bullets.  None (of course) are 
“magic” bullets, but taken together, they (hopefully) provide a coherent and workable 
alternative to a counter-insurgency strategy sometimes hobbled by a failure to think 
systematically about the nature of violent non-state organizations and their relationship to 
cultural millieus. 
(1)  Force on force confrontations are only a small part of the “confrontational 
equation.”  Non-state actors often embrace asymmetric warfare: the forces they field are 
non-traditional, striking in ways that maximize the effect they can produce on far larger 
forces while using only minimal resources.  Confronting such a force with yet another 
force (e.g., using soldiers to stop suicide bombers) can work, in the short term; but to 
have this as the primary or only aspect of your strategy is to play directly to the strengths 
of asymmetric confrontations (this is why insurgencies choose this tactic to begin with).  
We must be more asymmetric than our adversaries, and that involves coalition members 
striking in ways that maximize the effect they can produce using only minimal resources. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed much this sentiment in a 
portion of the infamous two-page memo to his staff (including the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 






Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next 
generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a 
long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop 
terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against 
the terrorists' costs of millions.87 
In the long-run, culture change considerations may be relatively inexpensive (for 
example, they may involve relatively simple educational reform in a given region), and 
can help us close the asymmetry in cost with violent non-state actors (VNSA). 
(2)  Insurgents can be deterred.  Violent non-state actors are often thought to be 
irrational.  For that reason, critics contend, it’s impossible to deter them…they can only 
be destroyed.  However, an open systems perspective on VNSA development reveals 
multiple opportunities we have to influence VNSA ontogeny in a way that uses 
proximate psychological mechanisms to preclude action contrary to our interests.  
Broaden our notion of deterrence and of psychology, and use those expanded notions to 
deter VNSA when they can be deterred.  If culture is primarily a psychological 
phenomenon, and insurgencies interact with cultural institutions during their growth and 
development, then we should be able to prevent insurgencies from forming, or deter them 
when they do, by having an appropriately subtle understanding of that complex system. 
(3)  We should all become ecologists.  A critical insight for counter-insurgency 
strategy is that webs of environments, interactions and processes both contribute to and 
constitute VNSA growth.  Those involved in formulating anti-terror strategy need to be 
experts in these webs of structured interactive relationships.  We could do worse than 
taking our cues from those who manage eco-systems such as foresters, farmers, and 
artificial life theorists.  Or, as UCLA research fellow Raphael Sagarin maintains, 
The real challenge is to apply evolutionary thinking to homeland security in a 
more structured, broad-based manner.  Evolutionary biologists, ecologists, and 
paleontologists understand better than anyone the evolutionary successes and failures of 
genes and species and what it takes to survive in the natural world.  Officials prosecuting 
the war on terrorism should bring experts on evolution into the discussion.88 
                                                 
87 See the original article in USA Today of 22 October 2003 available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm as of 10 January 2004, or the 
excellent summary of the incident from Slate Online Magazine at http://slate.msn.com/id/2090250/ 
available as of 10 January 2004. 
88 See his “Adapt or Die: What Charles Darwin can teach Tom Ridge about homeland security,” 
Foreign Policy (September/October 2003), 68–69. 
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The members of the military profession involved in combating VNSA directly 
should, at the end of the day, be part of a transformed cadre of military professionals, 
possessing a very different set of skills not traditionally associated with the warrior 
profession: this is not our grandfather’s security environment.  Biology, rather than 
physics, might be the operative structuring metaphor.  Culture, rather than firepower, may 
be the key center of gravity for achieving desired endstates. 
(4)  VNSA are not monolithic, nor do they exist in splendid isolation.  VNSA do 
not spring onto the international scene fully formed and made of solid granite.  They 
develop over time, and as they do so, they articulate parts that have functions.  VNSA are 
(thankfully) neither hermetically nor hermeneutically sealed.  They exist as part of an 
open system and the parts of a VNSA are constantly exchanging matter and energy with 
that system; more, the meanings VNSA leadership use to reinforce group and role-
specific identity, are not water-tight.  Undermine a VNSA’s “story,” and you go a long 
way toward winning the hermeneutic struggle.89  VNSA are not granite-like rocks that 
can only be crushed.  Instead, they are more like extremely porous stones—pour in the 
right kind of liquid at the right temperature, let it sit overnight, and the rock disintegrates 
from the inside, slowly falling apart.  The cultural milieus in which VNSA thrive are a 
critical part of counter-terrorism strategy; when we can’t get at the violent organization 
itself, we should think about influencing the culture which surrounds it in ways which 
hamper the organization’s operations or encourage their transformation into a legitimate 
non-violent actor. 
(5)  Confrontation happens in many ways.  There are multiple paths towards 
successful confrontation with VNSA and the environments that generate them.  We 
should not think of the war on terrorism or the Iraqi counter-insurgency effort as 
consisting only in armed struggle.  Rather, aspects of this war may be more like the “war” 
on illiteracy—war-like in the sense that we take (or ought to take) the root causes of 
illiteracy very seriously and struggle mightily against them, but not war-like in the sense 
that we shoot bullets at people who can’t read.  Effective use of the multiple instruments 
of state power is not to shrink from confrontation, nor to handle VNSA with kid gloves; 
                                                 
89 For elaboration, see the Casebeer and Russell Strategic Insight from March, 2005, available here: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.asp. Last accessed, 20 March 2006. 
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rather, it is to boost our ability to successfully shape the international security 
environment in a maximally efficacious manner. 
(6)  Effective, possibly non-traditional, intelligence aimed squarely at culture is 
critical.  Doing this all well is an intelligence intensive enterprise.  Much of our 
intelligence, especially military intelligence, is geared towards traditional battlefield-style 
warfare.  The sources and methods used to gather this intelligence will be useful, but 
perhaps more useful will be improved warning analysis and forecasting related to the 
root causes and transformative processes discussed in the first third of the book.  Much of 
this intelligence will be open-source, but will be manpower intensive and require a rich 
conceptual infrastructure in order to organize effectively.  Actionable intelligence needs 
to be placed in boxes that bear a clear connection to policy and strategy; open-systems 
theory does some of this work for us.  Most importantly, highlighting the failures of 
theorists to come to grips with the culture they want to influence from a systemic 
perspective cues us to the critical need for solid cultural intelligence.  This intelligence 
will be all about the inputs, processes, and outputs of the culture in which insurgents and 
VNSA “swim” and will consist of so much more than facts about customs and courtesies 
(recall our definition of culture at the start of this paper). 
The implication is not that none of these points are factored in to our current 
national security posture; on the contrary, seeds of them can be found scattered 
throughout our national security apparatus and in our reactions to events in contemporary 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Rather, my contention is that (in the main), we have tended (again, 
not in every case) towards output confrontations, ignored deterrent options, undervalued 
ecological insights, treated VNSA monolithically and without due regard to their 
meaning-laden nature, defaulted to a narrow sense of confrontation rather than a broad 
sense, and not focused effectively on the appropriate cultural intelligence tools.  
Moreover, our expertise is centered on specific groups, thus demanding a policy so 
nuanced that it lacks the cohesion required to synchronize the instruments of power.  This 
is understandable, given the lack of a comprehensive framework for thinking about such 
organizations.  If we are to overcome some of our disappointments with the results 
obtained thus far in our war on terror, though, we would do well to embrace systems 
thinking.  If the experience of the British with the Iraqi Mandate is to inform policy, we 
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would do well to think of culture as a system so we can examine the system with open 
eyes and in a scientifically rigorous manner, something the British manifestly failed to 
do.  We also need to understand the feedback relationships present with systems of 
culture (this would, in the best of worlds as prediction is always a mostly unachievable 
gold-standard, have enabled the British to predict how the coercive use of airpower 
would be viewed by the population of Iraq). 
 
D. RESEARCH AGENDA: WHERE TO NOW? 
In this thesis, we’ve visually scanned the visible portion of the culture, force, and 
terrorism iceberg, touching only its tip.  Ninety percent of an iceberg, alas, lies 
underwater.  Our brief survey, and attempt to formulate a synoptic theory of systems and 
culture, unearths multiple research programs and questions that beg for further 
exploration if we are to truly understand this security challenge.  Here are some 
suggestions regarding where, corporately, we ought to go next: 
(1)  Use the open systems approach to structure our thinking about culture and 
security.  Currently, there exists no unifying paradigm that allows us to think and speak 
coherently about culture and violence.  While there are some advantages to having a 
piece-meal approach to a topic, there are considerable benefits to be gained by structuring 
conversations across milieu using a common vocabulary.  My guess is that we can gain 
even deeper insight into many phenomena already well-discussed in the violent non-state 
actor literature by rethinking some positions in light of open systems theory.  The 
conceptual system we use to make sense of the world affects our ability to cope with it 
(compare the raw capacity of any five year old with that of any twenty year old), and the 
strength of open systems concepts as applied to terrorist groups and insurgencies lies in 
the explanatory unification and increased insight that results from using them.  With 
insight comes the ability to control a system.  Piece-meal approaches are useful, 
especially at the beginning of inquiry, but on the other hand nothing beats theoretical 
unification for increased prediction, control, and influence (and we’d like to do all these 
things for many cultural systems). 
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(2)  Validate factual assumptions about the state of the super-system.  Have we 
appropriately identified the aspects of the international environment that are conducive to 
VNSA formation?  Can we more precisely state the relationship between globalization 
and the rise of more porous cultures?  What is the relationship between state failure and 
radicalization of a culture (the British Mandate experience is suggestive here)?  Are there 
other interesting respects in which VNSA can construct environmental niches, or in 
which states can engage in niche destruction?  These are all open questions.  Our 
assumptions, while plausible and reflecting a broad consensus in the literature, 
nonetheless require further exploration to boost our confidence level and to gain insight 
into the web of ecological relations that is the international environment. 
(3)  Validate our initial take on super-system, system and sub-system 
relationships.  Cultures are very complex dynamic systems.  While the general concepts 
we’ve used to discuss parts and relationships are sound, they require further investigation.  
Many relationships between system variables have not been explored in any detail (the 
general shapes of the curves that define those relationships are not even known in many 
cases, as we haven’t thought to frame questions in this way).  Ninety percent of the 
iceberg remains unexplored (and in this paper, in any case, all I attempted was a 
definition of culture from the perspective of a system…aside from implying that Dodge 
was talking about aspects of socio-political culture in his book, I did not actually identify 
in any systematic way the inputs, processes and outputs that constitute culture; that is a 
task for a book or two). 
(4)  Boost rigor; drive quantitative analyses.  Some of our insights are driven by 
case-study based analyses.  These are useful, but have their shortcomings.  Ideally, some 
relationships which we discuss in qualitative terms could be expressed rigorously in a 
quantitative manner.  This would allow us to more thoroughly “reverse engineer” cultural 
change, working backwards from observed behavior to infer interior system structure and 
relationships.  Possessing this capacity is important for the articulation of a good culture 
change strategy or counter-insurgency operation. 
(5)  Develop species-specific functional architectures.  VNSA are alike in the 
critical respects (in much the same way that people are alike in the critical respects, 
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which is why it is possible to have a science of medicine); however, there are probably 
species-specific differences in functional architecture that space considerations have 
prevented us from exploring in any detail.  For example, certain types of VNSA (e.g., 
religious movements) will leverage charismatic identity entrepreneurs for their continued 
influence more so than others (e.g., crime networks).  This may result in crucial 
differences in the authority and maintenance sub-systems.  Knowledge of these 
differences will be critical for driving C-VNSA strategy formulation. 
(6)  Develop the allied intelligence tools and architecture required to validate the 
model and use it effectively.  To exhaustively validate some of the assertions made in our 
book will require a more theory-driven intelligence architecture than is in place at the 
national level currently.  There is a fundamental shortage of methodologists in the 
intelligence community.  We are not collecting against some of the variables and 
relationships necessary to gain full insight into culture systems and the VNSA system.  
Our framework offers insight that will allow us to drive indications and warning decks, 
for instance; identifying VNSA signatures and growth profiles will cue us to potential 
areas of concern.  The quality of our warning and threat estimates could increase if the 
thinking about them were structured in this way.  Systems insights may drive more 
effective forecasting tools.  Ideally, they could even allow us to answer Donald 
Rumsfeld’s demand for a way to know whether we are winning the war on terror.90  
Developing the intelligence tools and architecture that makes the most sense for 
confronting VNSA given our framework is extremely important.  Recall our earlier 
discussion of the critical importance of socio-cultural intelligence for an understanding of 
cultural systems. 
(7)  Put computational bite into the theory.  I’ve stressed the dynamic nature of 
the VNSA threat, and how our strategy should be sensitive to diachronic (across-time) 
concerns.  One way in which these arguments could be made more rigorous and useful is 
to translate them into workable computer models that allow analysts to accomplish 
                                                 
90 Rumsfeld asks: "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on 
terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas 
and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?" 
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forecasting, engage in stem and branch decision analysis, and stress test strategic options 
in silico before trying them on for size in real life. 
Much else remains to be done, as we’ve only scratched the surface in this paper.  
Open systems analysis of the culture/insurgency relationship is a progressive research 
program, capable of solving some of the anomalies that traditional approaches leave 
untouched. 
 
E. PARADIGM SHIFT: RESOLVING ANOMALIES, SECURING 
PROGRESS 
The philosopher and sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn is famous for 
articulating the idea of a paradigm shift.91  Kuhn postulated that all science is conducted 
with the boundaries of a paradigm: fundamental assumptions about what we should count 
as real and how we come to possess knowledge about those things.  From paradigms fall 
such items as testing procedures, methodological considerations, and vocabularies.  
Eventually, paradigms may enter a crisis stage because of their inability to resolve 
anomalies.  For instance, the Newtonian paradigm eventually entered crisis because of its 
inability to explain multiple stellar phenomena, including the precession of Mercury.  
When a new paradigm emerges that explains away the anomalies that the paradigm in 
crisis could not, is it oft-times adopted, becoming the new and normal way of doing 
science.  Progress occurs by the successive replacement of failing paradigms with more 
expansive explanatorily fecund paradigms. 
Current approaches to “forced culture change” have multiple anomalies.  Defense 
decision-makers have complained that we have no comprehensive understanding of 
insurgencies as a phenomena; we have no way of knowing whether or not we are winning 
the war on terrorism or whether or not we are succeeding in Iraq.  The way we best solve 
these anomalies is by shifting to a more comprehensive framework that gives us the tools, 
methods, and vocabulary we need to be able to make sense of them.  That new paradigm  
 
 
                                                 
91 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). 
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is the open systems framework, which can unify disparate approaches to force and culture 
change, providing us comprehensive insight into how we can manage this process so that 
it is effective. 
There is much at stake here.  The success of our national security posture (itself a 
manifesto for forced culture change abroad) rides on whether or not we are willing to 
think creatively and “outside of the box” about historical circumstances like the British 
Iraqi Mandate, Hizballah’s development, or Afghanistan and Iraq.  Taking insights from 
the force, culture and terrorism nexus and extending them so that we can ensure that 
instruments of state power are used in a way that actually achieves the desired effects 
remains our next great intellectual strategic challenge. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The exploration of culture, systems theory, and narratives which sparked this 
thesis has covered a good deal of ground in a short period of time.  In that sense, it is 
suggestive, and there are huge gaps within the nascent theory on offer which remain to be 
filled.  Even so, this general exploration suggests that we ought to be pessimistic about 
large-scale culture change using force—it is very difficult to get the relationship between 
the use of force and changes in inputs, processes and outputs in socially transmitted 
behavior exactly right.  On the other hand, this thesis suggests that force can indeed play 
a role in shifting socially transmitted behaviors in some contexts.  We ought not to be 
pessimists across the board.  In general, the intersection of military force, stories, and 
culture, lends itself to humility in aims, tempered with a meliorative attitude: while it may 
be difficult to get things right, in some circumstances, we can at least make things better.  
Where those circumstances obtain, military force has an appropriate role to play in 
shifting cultures.  Where not, though, we as strategists and policymakers need to be 
keenly aware of the limitations which the nature of force places on what can be done to 
shift stories, influence identities, and otherwise influence some of the systems involved in 
perpetuating learned behavior.  Getting this all right is complicated, but nothing less than 
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